A BRAVE DOGRA -- RELIGION IS SECONDARY - HUMAN CHARACTER IS ABOVE RELIGION

 A Dogra Brigadier , A Sikh Unit and an Armoured Car Troop that saved Srinagar

Agha H Amin

NOTE-  THE INDIAN SIGNAL ABOUT SIKH UNIT LANDING AT SRINAGAR WAS ROUTED THROUGH LAHORE PAKISTAN.IT WAS INTERCEPTED DECIPHERED AND UNDERSTOOD.THE TELEGRAPH AUTHORITIES APPROACHED THE CONCERNED OFFICIAL BUT WERE SIMPLY TOLD TO FU___K    OFF AS HE SLEPT LATE TILL MID DAY ?

After capturing Domel the last Dogra held locality on the main road to Srinagar on 23 October  in lorries and trucks. There was practically nothing between Muzaffarabad and Srinagar to stop the tribesmen. Brigadier Rajinder Singh the chief  of staff of the Kashmir State Forces was a brave man. 

He rushed  to Uri 63  miles west of Srinagar on the main Muzaffarabad-Srinagar road with 200 soldiers and blew a  bridge spanning a nullah (water course smaller than a river) on the main road on 23 October 19476. This delayed the advance of the tribesmen and other volunteers who now numbered about 5,000  by one day. Brigadier Rajinder Singh who believed in leading from the front was killed in action on 24th October. 

The tribesmen resumed advance and captured Baramula  which was  35  miles west of Srinagar on 26th October 1947. A very respectable Indian military historian has frankly admitted that 'had the lashkar gone on,there was nothing between Baramula and Srinagar to stop it7' The tribesmen sole motive was not liberation of Kashmir, and they started looting the town. Srinagar was  just a few hours lorry drive away from Baramula. 

According to Sardar Shaukat Hayat who was one of the Muslim League men tasked to oversee the invasion the issue was Rs 300,000 found in the Kashmir State Treasury. Khurshid Anwar foolishly argued that this money belonged to Pakistan Government (as if the tribesmen were fighting just for two nation theory, while no Muslim League leader was sixty miles near Baramula!) while the tribesmen correctly asserted that it belonged to them8. Once this issue was settled the tribesmen who had no conception of Time and Space factor insisted that they will not move before the three day Eid festival was over9. In the meantime the Indian GHQ was acting real fast. The Maharaja of Kashmir had been requesting the Indian government for military aid since 24th October and on 26th October signed the Instrument of Accession joining India. Meanwhile the Indians had already sent a staff officer from their military operations department on 25th October  to study the military situation.

 The Indians collected 30 Dakotas for the airlift and flew two companies of 1 Sikh to Srinagar on 27th October from Willingdon airport near New Delhi. At this moment the Indian situation was highly critical; only 40 men were holding a weak defensive position 5 kilometres east of Baramula. It was Indian good luck that all  commanding officers during this situation believed in leading from the front, Lieutenant Colonel Dewan Ranjit Rai the Commanding Officer of 1 Sikh being another such man. 

Dewan on landing at Srinagar immediately rushed in lorries to Baramula hoping to stop the Lashkar at the mouth of the funnel which opens east of Baramula into a wide valley as one advances from Baramula towards Srinagar. 1 Sikh joined the state troops 5 kilometres east of Baramula, but could not hold the Lashkar of 5,000 men. Dewan was killed in the fighting and the remaining elements of 1 Sikh withdrew  eastwards losing 24 men (killed) to take another defensive position at Patan 25 kilometres west of Srinagar10. On 28th more Indian troops flew into Srinagar and the balance of  strength started tilting in Indian favour. 

The tribesmen who were used to fighting based on hit and run tactics could not use weight of numbers in the open valley and resorted to bypassing tactics instead of the conventional infantry attack. They bypassed 1 Sikh's position at Patan from the flanks but was forced to stay close to the main road since manoeuvrability in the whole area was  restricted by marshes and small lakes and the  lashkar Pathans were by and large non swimmers11! By 2nd November the Indians had flown in a very strong infantry brigade (161 Brigade) consisting of approximately four battalions into Srinagar. 

In addition the overall command of Indian Army operations in Kashmir was entrusted to Headquarters Jammu and Kashmir Force based at Srinagar and headed by  Major General Kalwant Singh. The commander of 161 Indian Infantry Brigade(from 2nd November)  was Brigadier L.P Sen a Bengali Hindu with an excellent  Second World War record (unlike the first Muslim C-in-C of Pakistan Army as we shall discuss later)  in Burma where he had won a Distinguished Service Order12. 

The tribesmen had lost the really golden opportunity to capture Srinagar on 27th October. There is no doubt that Pakistan had lost its first decisive battle without the Pakistan Army's direct involvement. All was not over still; and another major opportunity to capture Srinagar  was yet to be lost. We will discuss this in a subsequent paragraph.

It may be noted that Mr Jinnah had ordered General Gracey the British Acting  C-in-C  (Messervy being on leave) of the Pakistan Army to attack Kashmir. Gracey who had been handpicked by Mr Jinnah on the grounds that Field Marshal Auchinleck the Supreme Commander of both the armies did not allow it!13 Auchinleck flew to Lahore the next day and convinced Mr Jinnah to retract his order. Auchinleck's threat that all British officers would be withdrawn in case such an order was pressed further convinced Mr Jinnah into retracting this order14. Mr Jinnah was unlucky unlike Nehru in having no Patel by his side. When Bucher the British C-in-C of the Indian Army advised the Indian government not to attack Hyderabad till the Kashmir War was over,and Patel insisted otherwise, Bucher threatened to resign. 

Patel simply told him on the spot that he could resign and then ordered Sardar Baldev Singh,the Defence Minister 'The Army will march into Hyderabad as planned tomorrow morning'15. Mr Jinnah was undoubtedly; by virtue of having taken an iron and  most resolute stand on the division of the Indian Army; the father of Pakistan Army. 

It was remarkable that as a very sick 71-year-old man in 1947, Mr Jinnah possessed the tremendous Coup d Oeil (unusual strategic insight) and resolution to order Gracey in October 1947 to employ two brigades of Pakistan Army to attack Kashmir; one from Sialkot going for Jammu and one from Rawalpindi going for Srinagar !16 It was indeed a pity that he did not possess any adviser, who could be called a 'Man' (A MAN LIKE PATEL) of sufficient ability and  independent judgement to convince him to  override Gracey who was behaving little better than a glorified headclerk and mouthpiece of Auchinleck!

 It was yet another tragedy that this glorified headclerk was retained and succeeded Messervy as the second C-in-C of Pakistan Army! It is strange that Shaukat Riza who wrote his book in the 1990s did not even mention this incident. A  reflection on the roundabout way in which the book was written and  on the analytical ability and grasp of military history of all the brilliant Principal Staff Officers of Pakistan's General Headquarters whose name are so proudly mentioned in the Acknowledgement section of his book17.

The Indian GHQ ordered 7th Light Cavalry to be ready to move into Kashmir in the end of October. Its Hindu Jat Squadron equipped with armoured cars (this was from 6 Lancers which went to Pakistan) started movement from Ambala on 1st November  and after a tough march reached Srinagar on the evening of 5th November. It has to be noted that although the Indians starting reinforcing Srinagar from 27th October onwards, the Indian superiority till the end of the first week of November was not as formidable as to ensure that Srinagar could not be threatened again, in case the Pakistan Army joined the tribesmen. 

This was so because the Indians were forced to defend simultaneously various locations which if lost could seriously jeopardise the whole  Indian position  in Kashmir. Their communication from Pathankot to Jammu  ran parallel and very close to the Pakistan border. Jammu the main town on their north-south communications was a few miles from Pakistan. In addition several Dogra garrisons at Bagh, Mirpur, Mendhar Poonch, Skardu, Leh etc were besieged by the various local militias and their fall could further exacerbate the Indian position in Kashmir. 

We had left the battle at Patan where 1 Sikh had taken a defensive position after being forced to withdraw from 5 kilometres east of Baramula. The tribesmen launched an attack on the reinforced Indian position at Patan on 30th October but failed to capture it due to intense strafing by Indian Air Force and the inherent defensive strength of the Indian defensive position which was well sited and dominated the area around. The tribesmen now decided to infiltrate, bypass the Indian position from both north and south and capture the Srinagar airfield, which was the centre of gravity of the whole battle. The tribesmen who were masters of guerrilla warfare successfully went into the rear of the Indian position from its south by infiltration (see definition) and managed to reach Badgam a village  just a few kilometres away from the Srinagar airfield on 3rd November. Here they successfully raided and dispersed an Indian infantry company inflicting in the process an extremely heavy loss on the Indians in terms of men killed including the Indian Company commander Major Somnath Sharma18. 

The tribesmen were very close to establishing a roadblock between Srinagar airfield and town, but their paucity in numbers restrained them from doing so. At this critical juncture when no Pakistani politician ever dared to cross the River Jhelum (it may be noted that till ceasefire in Dec 48, no major Muslim League leader including the Prime Minister ever visited Kashmir!) in order to inspire and pat the indomitable tribesmen. The Indian political leadership was more energetic and on hearing about our indomitable tribesmen's action at Badgam Sardar Patel the second most important Indian leader after Nehru visited Srinagar on 4th November19. Patel stressed the importance of holding Srinagar and assured the soldiers that reinforcements were on the way.

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There is one extremely important event which has generally been ignored  by most Pakistani military historians including Shaukat Riza.This was a conference held between 30th October and 4th November. Brigadier Akbar Khan the military man incharge of the raiders operations had returned to Pindi after a visit to the frontline at Srinagar. The tribesmen had not yet been repulsed and were planning infiltration operations with the aim of capturing Srinagar airfield. Akbar Khan's analysis about the operational solution to the problem of tribesmen's inability to attack well entrenched Indian infantry, supported by aircraft and artillery was to provide the tribesmen with armoured cars.

 Major Masud from 11 Cavalry stationed at Rawalpindi volunteered to take his own squadron's armoured cars to Srinagar, on his own initiative, without informing any superior headquarter. Akbar Khan states in his book 'Raiders in Kashmir' that  Major Masud said that the armoured cars would go without official permission, at his own risk and that the men would be in civilian clothes. This fact is proved by two independent authorities who were not from armoured corps and  thus had no  ulterior motivation  or desire to project 11 Cavalry. 

One was General Akbar who was present at the conference and the other was Brigadier Amjad Ali  Khan Chaudhry who was a gunner, and was also present at the same conference20. Akbar states that as the conference was coming to an end Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan a Muslim League leader and  Central Government Minister entered the room. Brigadier Sher Khan who was the Director Military Operations had also joined the discussion. This, Raja Ghazanfar (despite being from a so-called martial area)  was horrified about the armoured cars proposal, and according to both Akbar Khan and Amjad Chaudhry opposed the idea. He was supported by Brigadier Sher (Lion) Khan! Both the Minister and the Lion Hearted brigadier feared that such a step would lead to an open war between Pakistan and India21. 

Amjad Chaudhry states that one of the participants at this conference a Muslim League minister Raja Ghazanfar Ali  Khan  even voiced an apprehension that the unruly tribesmen may get unruly and damage the Maharajas palace at Srinagar22! 

Thus in the end Akbar Khan who was not directly in charge of the operations of tribesmen was overruled by a  pacifist Minister more keen to enjoy ministerial perks and a paper tiger brigadier wearing the mask of the high-sounding appointment of Director Military Operations! 

Major General Akbar Khan ,the real hero of the 1947-48 War.A DSO of Burma and the architect of philosophy of armed insurrection by aiding non state actors as state proxies.His ideas of use of non state actors as advanced in his writings were picked up much later and practised in Afghanistn,NEFA and Kashmir

The  only difference between India and Pakistan was not whether one side possessed armoured cars or not, but  the simple fact that while Mr Jinnah did not have any able Muslim deputy to advise him about military affairs (whether Punjabi, Hindustani or Pathan) 

Nehru was assisted by a much larger team of more resolute, more intellectually capable Hindu deputies like Patel  who ensured that armoured cars of 7th Light Cavalry; under command  Lieutenant N.G David; did reach Srinagar area on 7th  November and inflicted on the poorly armed tribesmen equipped with bolt action rifles a defeat at what the Indians themselves call the decisive battle of Shalateng! 

It may be noted that on the night of 2/3 November the tribesmen had successfully infiltrated north of the Indian main position at Pattan and had reached Shalateng in the rear of Pattan and a little to the north of Srinagar. Sen the Indian brigade commander countered this move by ordering 1 Sikh to pull back from Patan and to take a position at milestone four astride the Srinagar-Baramula road. By 6th November a large number of tribesmen who had been slowly infiltrating since 3rd November had gathered at Shalateng. 

Major Aslam and Major Khurshid Anwar the Pakistani officers in charge of these tribesmen decided to launch their main attack on Srinagar on the night of 6/7 November. The Indian Brigade Commander Brigadier Sen was also simultaneously analysing this threat and  had  decided to launch a deliberate  attack on this force supported by 7th Light Cavalry's squadron on 7th November. Sen's plan was to launch a frontal attack supported by aircraft  while one troop of 7th Light Cavalry  under Lieutenant David which had already been sent towards Bandipura on a recce mission and was already in the tribesmen's positions rear was ordered by wireless to attack the tribesmen from the rear23. The result was the battle of Shalateng on the morning of 7th November. 

The tribesman had started their main attack by infiltration on the  night of 6th November and were fighting on the northern outskirts of Srinagar when the Indians launched their main attack at first light. David's troop had already got into the rear of the tribesmen as planned; thus while the tribesmen were attacked frontally by Indian infantry supported by armoured cars and aircraft, armoured cars were attacking them from the rear. This was too much for men armed with bolt action rifles. The tribesmen were routed and it was with great difficulty that the situation was finally stabilised at least temporarily at Rampura a narrow defile halfway between Baramula and Uri24.

The abandonment of the conduct of war to tribesmen armed with bolt action rifles; while the Indians attacked them with Spitfires, Tempests, Harvards and Daimler/Humber/GMC Armoured cars was without any doubt  one of the most disgraceful acts in Pakistani military history. Even in the whole of 1947-48  War in all probability no regular Pakistan Army officer beyond the rank of captain was killed! An indicator that officers were not leading from the front. General Akbar Khan's views about the whole affair at Shalateng are more controversial. Akbar is of the opinion that, no battle ever took place at Shalateng, since the bulk of tribesmen had already withdrawn to Baramula on 5th November25. 

Akbar was not present at Shalateng and there is no doubt that a battle did take place at Shalateng; however it is possible that after appearance of the Indian regular army units supported by aircraft; and no similar counteraction from Pakistani side in shape of a similar commitment in terms of army/airforce involvement; it is likely that many tribesmen may have  withdrawn from Srinagar area between 27th October and 5th November. Akbar who was a man of much greater integrity than one thousand Aslam Khans etc was more accurate once he said in his book; ' They felt themselves let down by Pakistan. 

They had, of their own free will, agreed to come and fight in Kashmir but only against the State Army. In this they had done more  than what was expected of them. But no one had arranged with them. But no one had arranged with them to fight also against the regular Indian Army, with artillery tanks and aircraft26. It must be noted that there was one very major difference between the tribesmen and the vast majority of Muslim League leaders like Ghazanfar Ali and men like Aslam Khan, Khurshid Anwar etc, i.e.; these men and their ancestors since 1849 had been serving the British and even the Dogras (as far as Aslam Khan was concerned) and suddenly in 1940 or 1947 these men had become leaders of Pakistan or  officers of the  Pakistan Army; in contrast the tribesmen and their ancestors had been fighting the British with unequal intervals since 1849!

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Baramula was recaptured by Indians on 8th November and the Indians aided by their airforce which was attacking the entire tract of road between Baramula and Muzaffarabad27 continued their advance towards Uri. The Indian Prime Minister Nehru visited Kashmir on 11th November and travelled in an armoured car of 7th Light Cavalry till Baramula28. Compare this with the attitude of the Pakistani politicians. Neither Liaquat the Prime Minister nor any single of his ministers; Hindustani, Punjabi, Sindhi, Bengali or Pathan  crossed river Jhelum29. The attitude of Gracey in not agreeing to commit the army to Kashmir, however disgraceful and negative can be explained by saying that he was a foreigner! 

While Nehru boldly visited frontlines in Kashmir during the  war  ,Pakistans prime minister Liaquat Ali Khan dared not visit Kashmir till after cease fire.Extreme left Brigadier Akbar Khan ,the only Pakistani observer who noted this fact in his monumental book "Raiders in  Kashmir"

What kept the Pakistani political leadership from visiting the tribesmen who had won a territory that to this day has been ruled by Pakistan is hard to explain. Akbar Khan was not wrong once he said that fear prevented these leaders from visiting Kashmir while the war was on30! Liaquat eventually fell victim of an assassin in 1951.

 Had he died because of enemy action while visiting Kashmir, posterity would have remembered him as a much greater man. According to  Akbar, Messervy was the main culprit for spreading a fear of Indian reaction in Pakistan Army. 'Messervy addressing a meeting of G.H.Q officers warned us against hostilities with India. He said that, in his opinion, in case of war India would overrun Pakistan within ten days' 31. Compare this negative attitude with the Israeli Army which defeated far better armed and well organised Arab armies in the 1948 War. Just 30,000 Jews had served in the British Army  in the second world war32. More than 600,000 Muslims, more than half of them from areas which constituted 

Pakistan had fought in the Second World War and yet the Pakistani leadership was unwilling to stand on its own feet preferring the two unreliable British crutches i.e. Messervy and Gracey! Mr Jinnah had already done too much for the army by insisting on the division of Indian Army, against tremendous opposition on part of the Britishers. The great tragedy was that Mr Jinnah was surrounded by men of  zero military insight and devoid of all independent judgement. The Secretary of Defence, Mirza being a man who had never fought in actual war and the Muslim League politicians who were only good followers!

General Akbar Khan (then Lieutenant Colonel) met the tribals at Uri on 8th November .The tribals questioned Akbar about why Pakistan Government was behaving so spinelessly and not assisting them with artillery/regular troop support etc.Akbar Khan had no answer and tried to explain the legal position or simply lack of guts in the Pakistani political leadership and lack of guts in  most the Pakistan Army's Muslim officers, except few indomitable men like Major Tommy  Masud  to risk their commissions by disobeying orders of the British C-in-C and showing some initiative (authors opinion in italics) 33.

According to General Akbar  Khan the tribesmen were so demoralised and disappointed by lack of  Pakistan Army support that they withdrew from the frontline opposite Baramula on  31st October and 10th November, and withdrew to  Uri area, contemplating about returning to the tribal area34. Had the Indians possesses sufficient resolution or a commander with coup d oeil there was nothing stopping them from capturing Muzaffarabad between 31st October and 10th November. The same viewpoint is advanced by the official history35. 

 The probability that Akbar Khan who wrote the famous book 'Raiders in Kashmir' or Major Aslam, whose personal  account  was one of the many personal accounts used by the official historians who compiled the official history dealing with operations in Kashmir, were  exaggerating their own  role cannot be ruled out. There is one fact, however, that stands out as the crux of the issue, and which still raises the stature of the tribesmen higher than both Akbar or Aslam; i.e.  the fact that the initial shock of the tribal onslaught on Srinagar was so traumatic that it imposed a 'once bitten twice shy approach' on the mind of the Indian Commanders. This ensured that  the Indians despite the absence of any tribals in front of them; (as Messrs Akbar and Aslam allege) were in no mood to advance hurriedly  towards Muzaffarabad after having captured Baramula. 

After 10th November according to Akbar Khan the Mahsud and other tribesmen returned and played a major role in stabilising the front between Uri and Muzaffarabad36. 

As one advances westwards from Baramula to Uri the Jhelum Gorge becomes narrower and the defenders task becomes easier while the attackers task becomes more difficult. The Indian Army although supported by aircraft artillery and armoured cars was too psychologically shattered to advance rapidly westwards, despite the fact that most tribesmen were not fighting the battle, at least temporarily few demolitions and a few snipers who were too motivated to withdraw stopped the Indian advance approximately 3 miles west of Uri37.  

The official Pakistani history is hell bent upon giving the credit for this to Aslam Khan, while Akbar Khan also claims the credit for having stopped the Indians. The tribesmen who did the actual dirty work of fighting were never consulted by the authors of the official account! The start of snowfall from first week of December ensured that no major fighting took place between December 1947 and April 1948. 

We must also remember that the tribals did the actual fighting between 20th October and in November 1947,while books were written by Pakistan Army officers from 1970 onwards, some 23 years after the war. The Indian behaviour after capture of Uri showed that their higher commanders lacked the initiative, which was the only commodity required to capture Muzafarabad as far as the Indians were concerned. Instead the Indians wasted three infantry battalions,two artillery batteries and a squadron of armoured cars in passively defending Uri38. 

The Indian problem like Pakistan Army as we shall see later, was not lack of valour, for there was plenty of valour at the lower level; but lack of resolute  leadership at the higher level. In the same Uri area there was a living legend of the  pre-1945 British Indian Army; i.e. Jemadar Nand Singh a Punjabi Sikh who (as a Naik in 1/11 Sikhs)  had won the Victoria Cross in Burma at the Battle of Buthidang in Arakan on 12th March 1944 for having cleared three Japanese foxholes singlehandedly39. But there were no Rommels or Nicholsons or Bluchers. Thimaya who came to Uri area later was a little better than other Indian commanders, but his initiative was limited  and kept in check, by the higher military Indian commanders.

The battles around Srinagar, although small in  terms of size of forces involved  were the most crucial  battles of the Kashmir War. By 13th November when the Indians captured Uri the remotest chance of any future threat developing ever again to Srinagar was removed. The Srinagar Valley was the heartland of Kashmir. Possession of it meant that the Indians could reinforce and relieve its besieged garrisons at Leh, Skardu, Poonch. Attack Muzaffarabad, Tithwal, Kargil and mount air attacks on all supply routes on Murree-Muzaffarabad-Uri Road, Kaghan-Babusar-Chilas track, all tracks and roads around Poonch etc.

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