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The American Naval chiefs, however, favoured a central Pacific route. They argued that this would enable them to use their large and growing numbers of fast aircraft-carriers more effectively than in the more crowded waters around New Guinea — and would better fulfil their new concept of employing carrier task forces to isolate, and dominate, a group of islands. It would also fit their new idea of a seaborne supply system, instead of having to send their carriers back to port at intervals. They also argued that it would avoid the risk that the southerly route would suffer by being exposed to flank attacks from the Japanese forces lying among the mandated islands, while an advance along the southerly route, being more obvious and predictable, was itself likely to meet tougher and more continuous opposition. A more potent, if more private reason, was that the admirals wanted to keep the bulk of their new carrier strength out of MacArthur’s control — and his monopolising tendencies. ...