castles battles and bombs
| This book probably will not satisfy readers primarily interested in economic theory, or readers primarily interested in military history. But, if you want to look at military history from a different perspective, or if you are interested in how economic theory could be used to examine and evaluate a complex phenomenon (such as warfare), then this book is very much worth reading. The cross-disciplinary approach taken by the authors is a welcome change of pace, with an analysis that is different from the usual approaches taken in books about economics or books about military history. The first chapter discusses six economic principles that provide the analytical framework for the seven other chapters in the book: Opportunity Cost; Expected Marginal Costs and Benefits; Substitution; Diminishing Marginal Returns; Asymmetric Information and Hidden Characteristics; and Hidden Actions and Incentive Alignments. Although the authors use the six principles to look at various facets of military history, a reader should consider whether the principles could also be used to provide a different perspective on other subject areas, such as educational institutions, the legal system, and organizational decisions. Even if a reader is not ultimately persuaded by the thoughtful arguments made in this book, a reader can benefit from reading those arguments and thinking about them. Although I did not find some of the arguments made in the book to be persuasive, I found the book, overall, to be well worth reading. | |||
Table of contents : Contents......Page 8 List of Figures and Tables......Page 12 Preface......Page 14 One: Economics......Page 22 Economics......Page 27 Principle I: Opportunity Cost......Page 32 Principle II: Expected Marginal Costs and Benefi ts......Page 36 Principle III: Substitution......Page 41 Principle IV: Diminishing Marginal Returns......Page 45 Principle V: Asymmetric Information and Hidden Characteristics......Page 48 Principle VI: Hidden Actions and Incentive Alignments......Page 54 Conclusion: Economics—and Military History......Page 60 Two: The High Middle Ages, 1000–1300: The Case of the Medieval Castle and the Opportunity Cost of Warfare......Page 66 Opportunity Cost and Warfare......Page 70 The Ubiquity of Castles......Page 72 The Cost of Castling......Page 74 The Advantages of Castles......Page 80 The Cost of Armies......Page 87 Castle Building and the Other Principles of Economics......Page 93 Conclusion......Page 97 Three: The Renaissance, 1300–1600: The Case of the Condottieri and the Military Labor Market......Page 101 The Principal- Agent Problem......Page 104 Demand, Supply, and Recruitment......Page 106 Contracts and Pay......Page 110 Control and Contract Evolution......Page 121 The Development of Permanent Armies......Page 125 Condottieri and the Other Principles of Economics......Page 135 Conclusion......Page 138 Four: The Age of Battle, 1618–1815: The Case of Costs, Benefits, and the Decision to Offer Battle......Page 140 Expected Marginal Costs and Benefits of Battle......Page 143 The 1600s: Gustavus Adolphus and Raimondo de Montecuccoli......Page 148 The 1700s: Marlborough, de Saxe, and Frederick the Great......Page 158 Napoleonic Warfare......Page 168 The Age of Battle and the Other Principles of Economics......Page 175 Conclusion......Page 178 Five: The Age of Revolution, 1789–1914: The Case of the American Civil War and the Economics of Information Asymmetry......Page 180 Information and Warfare......Page 184 North, South, and the Search for Information......Page 186 Major Eastern Campaigns through Gettysburg......Page 189 Grant in Virginia......Page 202 The American Civil War and the Other Principles of Economics......Page 211 Conclusion......Page 215 Six: The Age of the World Wars, 1914–1945: The Case of Diminishing Marginal Returns to the Strategic Bombing of Germany in World War II......Page 218 A Strategic Bombing Production Function......Page 222 Bombing German War Production......Page 228 Bombing the Supply Chain and the Civilian Economy......Page 234 Bombing German Morale......Page 240 Assessing the Effect of Strategic Bombing......Page 245 Strategic Bombing and the Other Principles of Economics......Page 248 Conclusion......Page 256 Seven: The Age of the Cold War, 1945–1991: The Case of Capital- Labor Substitution and France’s Force de Frappe......Page 265 History of the Force de Frappe......Page 269 The Force Post –De Gaulle......Page 278 Justifying the Force......Page 281 The Force’s Effect on France’s Conventional Arms......Page 288 Substituting Nuclear for Conventional Forces......Page 293 The Force de Frappe and the Other Principles of Economics......Page 303 Conclusion......Page 306 Eight: Economics and Military History in the Twenty- first Century......Page 308 Economics of Terrorism......Page 310 Economics of Military Manpower......Page 319 Economics of Private Military Companies......Page 328 Economics, Historiography, and Military History......Page 340 Conclusion......Page 343 Notes......Page 350 References......Page 388 Index......Page 408 |
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