Machiavelli and the Problems of Military Force: A War of One’s Own

 

Central to Niccolò Machiavelli’s writing is the argument that a successful state is one that prefers to lose with its own arms (arma propriis) than to win with the arms of others (arma alienis). This book sheds light on Machiavelli’s critiques of military force and provides an important reinterpretation of his military theory. Sean Erwin argues that the distinction between arma propriis and arma alienis poses a central problem to Machiavelli’s case for why modern political institutions offer modes of political existence that ancient ones did not. Starting from the influence of Lucretius and Aelianus Tacticus on the Dell’arte della guerra, Erwin examines Machiavelli’s criticism of mercenary, auxiliary, and mixed forces. Giving due consideration to an overlooked conceptual distinction in Machiavelli studies, this book is a valuable and original contribution to the field.

Table of contents :  Cover Halftitle page Series page Title page Copyright page Contents Acknowledgments Introduction: The Problem of Hiero II 1. Machiavelli and the Military 2. The Outline of the Book 1 Atomic War: The Influence of Lucretius on Machiavelli’s Art of War 1. Introduction 2. Lucretius and the Bodies of War 3. What Constitutes Primordia? 4. Problems with Fifteenth-century Italian Warfare: uno impeto versus rifarsi 5. Lucretius and the Soul of War 6. Lucretius and the Anima—Maxima of Motion 7. Animo and the Many Lives of Machiavelli’s Legion 8. Hints of Lucretius in the Swerve of the Horse 9. Conclusion 2 Practical Proportions: Aelianus Tacticus in Machiavelli’s Art of War 1. Introduction 2. Aelianus Tacticus and De instruendis aciebus 3. Fabric versus graph: Machiavelli and Aelianus on Doubling by Rank and Doubling by File 4. Roman Renewal Styles, by Grades of Experience and Styles of Formation 5. On the Importance of Observing Proportion 3 Industries of Failure? Mercenaries and the Arms of Others1 1. Introduction 2. Citizen Militia or Band of Mercenaries? 3. One’s Own Arms 4. The Arms of Others 5. The Condottieri—Demonstrable Failures? 6. Milan, Naples, Venice, and Florence—A Tale of Four Cities 7. Fear of Success? Conspiracy and Patronage 8. Conclusion 4 Instrumental and Aleatory Aspects of Auxiliary Force in Machiavelli1 1. Introduction 2. Auxiliaries in the Prince 3. Auxiliaries in the Discourses 4. Livy: Rome’s Capuan Adventure 5. The People as Auxilium 6. Instrumentality—Captured by Debt 7. Umori 8. Lucretian Umori 9. A City of Flows 10. Back to Capua Conclusion 5 Transforming Compounds: Machiavelli’s Analyses of Mixed Force 1. Mixtures in Machiavelli and Lucretius 2. Machiavelli on Desire, Judgment, and the Body in Flux 3. Mixed Forces and Lucretian Echoes in the Prince 4. Mixed Forces in the Discourses 5. Hannibal, Scipio, Manlius Torquatus, Valerius Corvinus 6. Command Performance and the Valence of Leadership 7. Appius Claudius and Intrinsic Forces 8. Conclusion Conclusion: Captains of Critique (Beyond the Militia)—Armed and Unarmed Prophets Notes Bibliography Index