Major Shamshads Rebuttal of Farouk Adams Account of Chawinda-Defence Journal September 2001
20 July, 2008
Major Shamshads Rebuttal of Farouk Adams Account of Chawinda-Defence Journal September 2001
The Editor
Defence Journal
Karachi.
Dear Sir,
Brig (Retd) Muhammad Ahmed
The May 2001 edition of your esteemed magazine carries a letter by Brig (Retd) Mohammed Ahmed which mentions as under,
“Major Shamshad is right, in a way, when he says only Charlie Squadron went up to Pasrur. The little difference being that only Charlie Squadron went up to Pasrur the others were turned back half way when the Jassar fiasco was discovered.
I would like to correct the record here.
The entire action of night 7/8 and 08 Sept has been covered in a single article appeared in Oct 1997 edition of DJ. I have nowhere stated or recorded what Brig Ahmed has ascribed to me. An editing error has appeared in the March 2001 edition of DJ which the Brig should have corrected rather than confirming it.
The fact is that entire regiment moved to Pasrur on its way to Jassar. The regiment was detained at Pasrur while Charlie Squadron was despatched to Jassar which reached Narowal at 0300 hours and turned about to reach Pasrur at 0500 hours.
BATTLE OF CHAWINDA
The August issue of DJ carries a letter by Farooq Adam SJ on the subject and another by Mr A H Amin who is on the panel of D J. Both the gentlemen have made reference to me. I, therefore, feel obliged to put in my word to keep the record straight.
Farooq Adam, as a direct participant appears to have reservations about the description of the battle by A H Amin who was not a participant. He has merely conducted research and has adequately defended his point of view by quoting his source of knowledge. A H Amin has quoted Gen Fazle Moqeem who has reflected upon command quality of Brig Ali and how 35 FF was massacred in Nawa Pind in 1971. To support the opinion of Gen Fazle Moqeem I can quote one out of several ill planned attacks which fizzled out in initial stages, ordered by Brig Ali in 1965. On the morning of 17 Sept 3rd FF were ordered to attack Jassora with a company. A detailed discription has been published in May 1998 issue of DJ. For those who could not reach that edition and also to prove inanity of command I shall describe the attack precisely. The company was commanded by Capt Raheem Shah and was supported by my troop of three tanks.
I submitted to CO 3FF that before attacking Jassoran, which was 2000 yards away from Railway line, we had to clear Buttardograndi half way between Railway line and Jassoran. I also informed him that area Jassoran-Buttardograndi is occupied by a tank regiment supported by an infantry battalion which I faced on 16 Sept and eventually my troop was shot up by that force. It was impossible to dislodge an armoured brigade by attacking with a company and three tanks. My plea was brushed aside with remark that Butterdograndi had been cleared during the night. As we formed up behind railway line heavy artillery fire was dropped on us causing casualties to our infantry. In the FUP we located a centurian in Battalion one which was destroyed. Finally we attacked without artillery. Capt Raheem Shah and his company displayed tremendous courage.
8 Gharwal was entered in the middle of 5 feet high maze crop. As our men reached the trenches they were fired at from point blank range. Many of them fell other turned and went to ground. They were surprised: I saw this massacre standing in cupola from a distance of 50 yards. I moved the tank up and mounted the trenches. By this time I had reached the killing range of enemy tanks deployed in Jassoran. My tank was shot up and went into flames. My second tank was also hit and damaged. The third tank turret # 1, tank commanded by LD Kamal prudently did come up and was saved. In this swift action two enemy tanks were also destroyed. Here the attack fizzled out.
It is now for the reader to assess the competence of higher command. In my opinion it was callous act to launch a company and three tank against an armoured brigade. To further illustrate my point of view, a quotation from a book (Guns of August by Barbara Tuchman) will be in place.
Quote “When the moment of live ammunition approaches, the moment to which his professional training is directed, the issue of the combat, even the fate of the campaign may depend on his decision. What is happening in the heart and vitals of a commander. Some are made bold by the moment, some irresolute, some carefully judicious, some paralyzed and powerless to act” Unquote. I place ours higher in the last category.
After having gone through the letter of Farooq Adam and his two earlier scripts, on the subject (“Hero of Chawinda” published in daily The News in April/ May 1992 and “THE ALI OF CHAWINDA”published in UNIFORM Sept 1994 issue) I can say that his writing is more of fiction than honest description of the events on the battlefield. On reading his script of 1992, I expressed my views which have been published in daily THE NEWS of May 1992. I reproduce below the opening paragraph of the article which delivers goods to those who are interested to know the facts.
Quote”On the outset I shall mention here that I have never served in the direct command of Brig Ali. Hence there is no possibility of having ill will or malice towards him. However, I feel that both the writers have tried to aggrandize the revered general out of proportion. I hold this opinion as I have first hand knowledge about the Battle of Chawinda. I was a troop leader and squadron commander in 25 cavalry which was a part of Brig Ali’s brigade. Mr Agha Babar should show Adam’s article to his literary friends in Newyork to be appreciated as a good piece of literature. Anyone with little knowledge about army matters and warfare will confront him with awkward questions such as, Why should Brig Ali ask Col Nisar as to how many tanks did he have? Was he ignorant of the organisation and deployment of his only tank regiment?. Why did Farooq Adam leave his defensive position when enemy tanks were still more than a mile away? Why did he not wait for the tanks to destroy once they reached the killing zone of his ante tank weapons? Why was Chobara captured and abandoned time and again?. Was a pitched battle fought at Chobara? If so what was the score of casualties? And many more such questions.’Unquote.
The knowledge which Farooq Adam wants to share with the readers is of no consequence unless he first fixes his position in a fighting unit. Was he a platoon /company commander or a staff officer. I have gone through his three scripts mentioned above. Only at one place (UNIFORM Sept 1994) he said that he was attached to Major Mohammad Hussain whose company was to follow 25 cavalry tanks on the morning of 8 Sept. Was he attached to Major Mohammad Hussain to advise him.
I will not go in details here, which of course I have, to prove that whatever Farooq has written is all truth. Only one example is enough to prove what I state.
On page 59 of the periodical UNIFORM of Sept 1994 he writes while describing the dialogue between Brig Ali and Col Nisar. “How many tanks do you have? One squadron of tanks right here, another dismounting from transporters nearby”. He claims that these words were exchanged at Chawinda in the morning at Chawinda on 8 Sept. This is totally untrue. The whole regiment was concentrated at Pasrur. Col Nisar was called by Brig and told “enemy had come think about it”. He must have also told him that enemy tanks were advancing on Charwa-Cawinda track. What happened thereafter has been recorded by me in the form of 8 articles in D J starting from Oct 1997 to May 1998. 9th and concluding article will appear in near future. My suggestion to Farooq is to write an account of 17 days as he saw the battle moving day by day, mere eulogy is not welcomed.
Passing orders is a simple affair.The quality of effort a commander makes to insure the implementation of the order is what that matters. The extent of personal involvement, his control and direction of the events, his presence at the place and time where the fate of the battle is being decided are the factors which go in to assess the competence of a commander. In this light I found our leader wanting.
Maj (Retd) Shamshad Ali Khan
Defence Journal
Karachi.
Dear Sir,
Brig (Retd) Muhammad Ahmed
The May 2001 edition of your esteemed magazine carries a letter by Brig (Retd) Mohammed Ahmed which mentions as under,
“Major Shamshad is right, in a way, when he says only Charlie Squadron went up to Pasrur. The little difference being that only Charlie Squadron went up to Pasrur the others were turned back half way when the Jassar fiasco was discovered.
I would like to correct the record here.
The entire action of night 7/8 and 08 Sept has been covered in a single article appeared in Oct 1997 edition of DJ. I have nowhere stated or recorded what Brig Ahmed has ascribed to me. An editing error has appeared in the March 2001 edition of DJ which the Brig should have corrected rather than confirming it.
The fact is that entire regiment moved to Pasrur on its way to Jassar. The regiment was detained at Pasrur while Charlie Squadron was despatched to Jassar which reached Narowal at 0300 hours and turned about to reach Pasrur at 0500 hours.
BATTLE OF CHAWINDA
The August issue of DJ carries a letter by Farooq Adam SJ on the subject and another by Mr A H Amin who is on the panel of D J. Both the gentlemen have made reference to me. I, therefore, feel obliged to put in my word to keep the record straight.
Farooq Adam, as a direct participant appears to have reservations about the description of the battle by A H Amin who was not a participant. He has merely conducted research and has adequately defended his point of view by quoting his source of knowledge. A H Amin has quoted Gen Fazle Moqeem who has reflected upon command quality of Brig Ali and how 35 FF was massacred in Nawa Pind in 1971. To support the opinion of Gen Fazle Moqeem I can quote one out of several ill planned attacks which fizzled out in initial stages, ordered by Brig Ali in 1965. On the morning of 17 Sept 3rd FF were ordered to attack Jassora with a company. A detailed discription has been published in May 1998 issue of DJ. For those who could not reach that edition and also to prove inanity of command I shall describe the attack precisely. The company was commanded by Capt Raheem Shah and was supported by my troop of three tanks.
I submitted to CO 3FF that before attacking Jassoran, which was 2000 yards away from Railway line, we had to clear Buttardograndi half way between Railway line and Jassoran. I also informed him that area Jassoran-Buttardograndi is occupied by a tank regiment supported by an infantry battalion which I faced on 16 Sept and eventually my troop was shot up by that force. It was impossible to dislodge an armoured brigade by attacking with a company and three tanks. My plea was brushed aside with remark that Butterdograndi had been cleared during the night. As we formed up behind railway line heavy artillery fire was dropped on us causing casualties to our infantry. In the FUP we located a centurian in Battalion one which was destroyed. Finally we attacked without artillery. Capt Raheem Shah and his company displayed tremendous courage.
8 Gharwal was entered in the middle of 5 feet high maze crop. As our men reached the trenches they were fired at from point blank range. Many of them fell other turned and went to ground. They were surprised: I saw this massacre standing in cupola from a distance of 50 yards. I moved the tank up and mounted the trenches. By this time I had reached the killing range of enemy tanks deployed in Jassoran. My tank was shot up and went into flames. My second tank was also hit and damaged. The third tank turret # 1, tank commanded by LD Kamal prudently did come up and was saved. In this swift action two enemy tanks were also destroyed. Here the attack fizzled out.
It is now for the reader to assess the competence of higher command. In my opinion it was callous act to launch a company and three tank against an armoured brigade. To further illustrate my point of view, a quotation from a book (Guns of August by Barbara Tuchman) will be in place.
Quote “When the moment of live ammunition approaches, the moment to which his professional training is directed, the issue of the combat, even the fate of the campaign may depend on his decision. What is happening in the heart and vitals of a commander. Some are made bold by the moment, some irresolute, some carefully judicious, some paralyzed and powerless to act” Unquote. I place ours higher in the last category.
After having gone through the letter of Farooq Adam and his two earlier scripts, on the subject (“Hero of Chawinda” published in daily The News in April/ May 1992 and “THE ALI OF CHAWINDA”published in UNIFORM Sept 1994 issue) I can say that his writing is more of fiction than honest description of the events on the battlefield. On reading his script of 1992, I expressed my views which have been published in daily THE NEWS of May 1992. I reproduce below the opening paragraph of the article which delivers goods to those who are interested to know the facts.
Quote”On the outset I shall mention here that I have never served in the direct command of Brig Ali. Hence there is no possibility of having ill will or malice towards him. However, I feel that both the writers have tried to aggrandize the revered general out of proportion. I hold this opinion as I have first hand knowledge about the Battle of Chawinda. I was a troop leader and squadron commander in 25 cavalry which was a part of Brig Ali’s brigade. Mr Agha Babar should show Adam’s article to his literary friends in Newyork to be appreciated as a good piece of literature. Anyone with little knowledge about army matters and warfare will confront him with awkward questions such as, Why should Brig Ali ask Col Nisar as to how many tanks did he have? Was he ignorant of the organisation and deployment of his only tank regiment?. Why did Farooq Adam leave his defensive position when enemy tanks were still more than a mile away? Why did he not wait for the tanks to destroy once they reached the killing zone of his ante tank weapons? Why was Chobara captured and abandoned time and again?. Was a pitched battle fought at Chobara? If so what was the score of casualties? And many more such questions.’Unquote.
The knowledge which Farooq Adam wants to share with the readers is of no consequence unless he first fixes his position in a fighting unit. Was he a platoon /company commander or a staff officer. I have gone through his three scripts mentioned above. Only at one place (UNIFORM Sept 1994) he said that he was attached to Major Mohammad Hussain whose company was to follow 25 cavalry tanks on the morning of 8 Sept. Was he attached to Major Mohammad Hussain to advise him.
I will not go in details here, which of course I have, to prove that whatever Farooq has written is all truth. Only one example is enough to prove what I state.
On page 59 of the periodical UNIFORM of Sept 1994 he writes while describing the dialogue between Brig Ali and Col Nisar. “How many tanks do you have? One squadron of tanks right here, another dismounting from transporters nearby”. He claims that these words were exchanged at Chawinda in the morning at Chawinda on 8 Sept. This is totally untrue. The whole regiment was concentrated at Pasrur. Col Nisar was called by Brig and told “enemy had come think about it”. He must have also told him that enemy tanks were advancing on Charwa-Cawinda track. What happened thereafter has been recorded by me in the form of 8 articles in D J starting from Oct 1997 to May 1998. 9th and concluding article will appear in near future. My suggestion to Farooq is to write an account of 17 days as he saw the battle moving day by day, mere eulogy is not welcomed.
Passing orders is a simple affair.The quality of effort a commander makes to insure the implementation of the order is what that matters. The extent of personal involvement, his control and direction of the events, his presence at the place and time where the fate of the battle is being decided are the factors which go in to assess the competence of a commander. In this light I found our leader wanting.
Maj (Retd) Shamshad Ali Khan
Comments
Post a Comment
Only substantial and serious comments will be accepted .