Brig Kamal Alam and Colonel Anwars Criticism of Chawinda and A.H Amin's Reply Defence Journal January 2002
20 July, 2008
Brig Kamal Alam and Colonel Anwars Criticism of Chawinda and A.H Amin's Reply Defence Journal January 2002
Dear Major Sehgal,
In his letter in Defence Journal of Aug 2001, Mr . Amin says that in the Pak Army Journal (Summer 97) Brig Nisar does not mention any order coming his way from his Brigade Comd on 8 Sept 1965. I am no historian but some questions immediately come to mind viz. Does Col Nisar also mention that the Brigade Commander told him to “do something”? If not who is to be believed, Brig Nisar or Gen Riza. And if he was not told to “do something“, what major event galvanized him into taking this unilateral action against the enemy advance? Did he get information about the enemy advance himself, or did someone give it to him, and if so who? When he got his information, was he in the presence of the Brigade Commander , or was in wireless contact with him? And when he decided to strike out on his own, did he at least inform the Brigade? And if so what transpired; or did the rest of the Brigade merely follow 25 Cav through guess-work?
The point I want to make is that in order to be classified as “history“ we have to first establish whether 25 Cav was a part of a larger formation, or was acting in a vacuum. And if it was subordinate to
24 Brigade, did it take itself out of the Brigade ORBAT on its own, or did if take the Brigade under its own command. This relationship can only be settled by the communication between the two. So far it has been considered a settled fact beyond any controversy, that this Brigade and all its components fought an outstanding action. After all there have been M Ds and presentation on the subject for the last 36 years and most officers have had a chance to take part in one or another of these. And no adverse comment has come to tarnish the reputation of any officer of the brigade.
It is only recently that through one sentence of Maj Gen Shaukat Riza ‘s Book almost all infantry actions of this battle seem to have been nullified, and the brave conduct of the Bridge Commander has been found fit to be relegated to those who functioned below par.
I am afraid that Gen Riza’s Book is primarily the amalgam of various war diaries, with very little original research , “officially sponsored” to give the “official view“. A very good insight into its historical value and credibility lies in what it has to say regarding the change of command in Chamb, which is a scandal that has refused to be hushed up despite the best official efforts. On page 121 of the book Gen Riza blatantly states that change of Command in Chamb was pre-planned. And then he goes on to brazenly assert that this was confirmed by most officers in GHQ and 12 Div. He forgot that this was a deliberate, set-piece attack, the operation orders for which per force would have to be attended by GOC 7 Div, if the command was to change, and all the lower formations would have known about it, and at least some shred of documentary evidence of this effect would have survived, at least in GHQ. But there is not a word extant to corroborate this cover-up. And what is worst is that immediately after the war in Staff College under, Gen Riza was serving “a 12 Div officer” who was the GOC of this Division. He was Gen Akhtar Malik. At a time when even subalterns like me could question Gen Malik on this subject and get a candid reply, it is impossible to believe that Gen Riza did not know all details of this change from the horse’s mouth. And knowing this and then wilfully distorting history is deserving of the strongest opprobrium. And then DJ takes one line of this “history” and knocks out all infantry actions, and goes further to malign the commander of Chawinda Brigade! And now this is to pass for history?
Brig (Retd) Kamal Alam, TJ
House No. 5
Street # 25 F-7/2,
Islamabad
14 Dec 2001
To : The Editor Defence Journal
Karachi
Sir,
I refer to letter by Mr. Farouk Adam and Mr. Amin on the Battle of Chawinda (Defence Journal Aug 2001). In 1972, in company of some regimental at officers I met Gen A .A Malik in Mangla. The question of 3 F F came up. He said the heaviest attacks seemed to come wherever this unit was deployed. As such at one point he had to ask the Div HQ if there was any possibility for this unit to be relieved and rested. The Div HQ said this was not possible. War diaries are often not written immediately . There are often inaccuracies in them. Is it possible that this event is being referred to by both writers? At any rate 24 Brigade War Diary should also be consulted.
Mr. Amin quotes Gen Riza’s Book i.e. Brig Malik got on to ...............” From this it is obvious that it means the communication was by wireless or telephone. But I have attended an M D on this battle and also heard its narration from Brig Shinwari. Both were nearer to Farouk Adam’s explanation of events of
8 Sept. Mr. Amin says he has referred to “official sources” and “officially sponsored” GHQ account of this Battle. This is its weak point. Our “officially sponsored accounts” unfortunately have been cover-ups. Gen Riza wrote about such an important battle without interviewing any infantry CO, or any officer of the Brigade HQ, when they were all alivel! What sort of history is this?
I heard the talk by Lt Gen Tariq S. J to which Farouk Adam has referred. I have also heard him on the subject in person. He said that all units gave their very best but also that the Brigade Commander’s conduct, whose HQ was often in line of direct fire, was most inspiring.
After reading the original article one gets the impression that the whole battle was fought by Col Nisar and Maj Ahmed ably supported by Brig Amjad Chowdhry’s guns. It seems infantry was non-existant! Granted it was a tank battle and very well done by 25 Cav. But I can’t recall any DEFENSIVE tank battle over two weeks duration without an infantry firm base. And if Chawinda base did not hold, that would be the end of the tank battle also. But the infantry did hold, better than any infantry brigade on either side. And the Brigade Commander showed more pluck than any officer of his rank, also on either side. I am willing to stand corrected on this. And if not corrected, will not this make these units and Brig Malik deserving of credit?
Lt Col Mohammad Anwar
Flat No. 123 — C
Askari Housing Complex
Walton - Lahore
5 Dec 2001
REPLY TO CRITICISM OF BRIG ALAM AND COL ANWAR ON ARTICLE “BATTLE OF CHAWINDA” AND SUBSEQUENT LETTERS PUBLISHED IN DJ MARCH 2001 ISSUES AND AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER 2001 ISSUES
It is amusing as well as encouraging to note that this scribe’s article on Chawinda Battle of 1965 published in Defence Journal March 2001 issue continues to attract flak from critics!
The latest in the series are two letters , both written by retired officers . First of all I must clarify that my sole motivation in all writing has been to endeavour to write “what men did” rather than what “they ought ideally to have done” or what “someone later with the benefit of hindsight tried to portray , what they had done”. Thus the analysis of Chawinda Battle done with pure loyalty to service without any inter arm rivalry or nationalistic motivation. Pure and unadulterated military history filtered dispassionately separating fact from fiction and myth from reality. How far I succeeded is for readers to judge.
History as Frederick the Great once said can be well written only in a free country and ours has been continuously under civil or military dictators since 1958. Enters Defence Journal which in its resurrected form from 1997 picked up the gauntlet of serving as a medium of intellectual honesty and forthright criticism and published facts which were unpalatable for some and welcomed by the vast multitude. A breath of fresh air in a country reduced to intellectual stagnation because of years of censorship and intellectual persecution! I had written for the Pakistan Army Journal and Citadel but had left military history writing when in 1998 through a dear friend I discovered that there is a new Defence Journal in Karachi which is open to some critical writing!
I maintain as one great master of English prose said that “all history so far as it is not supported by contemporary evidence is romance”! Battle of Chawinda published in DJ March 2001 was thus not romance! What many in this country wrote and was outwardly military history was essentially “Romance”! Inspiring, superhuman but a myth promiscuously mixed with reality!
Chance plays a key role in battle and at Chawinda chance played a very important role! Nisar, when he deployed 25 Cavalry did not know what was in front of him ! KK Singh Commander 1st Indian Brigade also did not know what was in front of him! This mutual ignorance saved Pakistan on that crucial day ! Later heroes were created! I repeat “Heroes were created” ! This was what the article was all about !
What were the key facts? Most important tangible fact was “casualties” ! These were deliberately hidden since these would have let the cat out of the bag! Everyone would have discovered who really fought and who got gallantry awards on parochial,regimental or old boy links !How many were killed in the biggest military blunder “Operation Gibraltar”! This is Top Secret ! How many infantry men died at Chawinda? Again no mention of any figures! The real motivation here is not national interest but to preserve or more important to “guard reputations”
Brigadier Kamal Alam’s Letter
a. I stick to the assertion that the “broad front deployment” was done by Nisar and Nisar alone and Brigadier Abdul Ali Malik had no role in it. It is another matter that Nisar also did not know what was in front of him. It was like Jutland when both contending fleets were running towards each other at express train speed. Why Nisar behaved as he did and what actually happened even today is hard to understand, whatever anyone may claim now with the benefit of hindsight! Brigadier Alam offers no tangible proof that the actions of 25 Cavalry had anything to do with what Brig A.A Malik told Nisar. Nisar was told to “do something” and Nisar did something without the least clue of what was in front of him. The important thing is that Nisar did something rather than getting paralysed into inertia and inaction! I may add a personal note here. I understand that Alam’s elder brother Brig Mujahid Alam COS 31 Corps while this scribe was commanding 5 Independent Armoured Squadron was a fine soldier.
b. Alam raises the question about the controversial “Do Something” order by Brig A.A Malik to Lt Col Nisar CO 25 Cavalry. The same words were repeated by Nisar in his article published in Pakistan Army Journal in 1997. Then Alam raises the question about 25 Cavalry functioning in a vacuum. 24 Brigade had two infantry units, one which had been overrun and dispersed on 8th September i.e 3 FF and 2 Punjab which was at Chawinda. The crucial action took place at Gadgor few miles north of Chawinda in which 25 Cavalry faced the entire Indian 1st Armoured Division. This was an extraordinary situation and Nisar acted on his own best judgement since Malik had abdicated to Nisar by stating that he should do something. It is another thing that Nisar also did not know what was in front of him and acted boldly and unconventionally. Had he known what was in front of him he may have been paralysed by inertia and inaction! But this is speculation and some part of history always remains unfathomed and hidden! Nisar acted through sheer reflex and deployed his unit in an impromptu manner. The fire fight which took place at Gadgor between 0900 hours and 1200 hours was a pure tank versus tank affair. 25 Cavalry versus two leading tank regiments of Indian 1st Armoured Division! Thus the Indian Armoured Corps historian stated “The Armoured Brigade had been blocked by two squadrons of Pattons and in the first encounter had lost more tanks than the enemy had...the worst consequence of the days battle was its paralysing effect on the minds of the higher commanders. It took them another 48 hours to contemplate the next move. This interval gave Pakistanis time to deploy their 6th Armoured Division...in fact the golden opportunity that fate had offered to the 1st Armoured Division to make worthwhile gains had been irretrievably lost” (Refers-Pages-393 & 394-History of Indian Armoured Corps-Gurcharan Singh Sandhu-Vision Books-Delhi-1990). Thus the Indians acknowledged “This regiment’s (25 Cavalry) performance was certainly creditable because it alone stood between the 1st Indian Armoured division and its objective, the MRL canal”.
(Refers-Page-395-Ibid).
c. At Gadgor on 8th September it was 25 Cavalry and 25 Cavalry alone which saved the day. Major Shamshad a direct participant has already stated on record that SJs were awarded to some officers for an attack in which not a single man was killed on both sides!
d. 25 Cavalry was part of 24 Brigade but all that Nisar its CO did on the crucial 8th September at Gadgor was based on his own judgement. On 9th and 10th September no fighting took place as Indians had withdrawn their armoured division to the crossroads. On 10th September, 6 Armoured Division took over and 24 Brigade was a part of 6 Armoured Division. On 8th September there was a vacuum and Nisar acted in a sitaution which can be classified as one characterised by “absence of clear and precise orders”!
e. Shaukat Riza’s book is basically a compilation of existing facts. It has historical value since Riza was allowed access to official records.
f. The change of command aspect about which Alam asserts is correct and was officially hushed up but why should Shaukat Riza have any sympathy for the armoured corps of 1960s which was arrogant and looked down on artillery as I personally witnessed right till 1980s as a young officer in Kharian and Multan? Artillery officers were never welcomed in armoured corps unit messes unless real exceptions based on personal ties and armour officers rarely visited artillery messes.
g. Chawinda was a tank battle, thus armour suffered more casualties. On the other hand Lahore was an infantry battle where the indomitable 1st Baluch lost something like around 30 killed in battle , more casualties than most infantry units in the much trumpeted Grand Slam.
h. Now I offer some figures for the readers to form their own conclusions.
KILLED-CASUALTIES GRAND SLAM
UNIT KILLED CASUALTIES
6 PUNJAB 9
9 PUNJAB 15
13 PUNJAB 24
14 PUNJAB 3
15 PUNJAB 8
8 BALOCH 10
11 CAVALRY 19
13 LANCERS 14
REFERS-PAGE-109-PAKISTAN BHARAT JANG-1965-COL MUKHTAR GILLANI-RAWALPINDI-JULY 1998 AND UNIT SOURCES 13 LANCERS AND 11 CAVALRY
The above casualties prove that Grand Slam was both an infantry and armour battle yet armour suffered proportionately more casualties since the effective battle strength of a tank unit is half that of an infantry unit. 14 Punjab lost just 3 killed while 10 Guides Cavalry at Chawinda lost 3 killed in officers alone apart from 12 OR/JCOs killed! 11 Cavalry lost more in killed casualties in 1965 War than any of the above units of the Grand Slam i.e 34 killed. No fault of infantry since Chawinda was an essentially a tank battle.
i. Brigadier Alam does not give any figures which prove that infantry suffered more casualties at Chawinda. I have already admitted in my letter that the only infantry unit which bore the brunt of Indian assault was 3 FF on the 8th September. 3 FF aside the brunt of the attack at Chawinda was borne by armour units since Chawinda was a tank battle. At Lahore, the brunt of the attack was faced by infantry since Lahore i.e 10 Division battle was an essentially infantry battle. Thus, there were units like 1st Baloch and 16 Punjab which suffered tremendous casualties.1st Baloch suffering casualties of 31 killed in 10 Division Area (Refers-Page-139-Col Gillani-Op Cit). 16 Punjab suffering casualties of 106 killed and 70 missing most of whom were killed (more than total of all regular infantry units in Grand Slam) (Refers-Page-138-Col Gillani). On the other hand there were formations which in words of Colonel Mukhtar Gillani exaggerated the fighting and suffered nominal casualties like the 103 Brigade in 10 Division area (Refers Page-143-Col Gillani).
j. Even at formation level Chawinda was not a big battle in terms of casualties since the Indian 1 Corps suffered less casualties than 11 Indian Corps in Ravi Sutlej Corridor.
k. Brigadier Alam has mixed inter arm rivalry with operational leadership and personalities. Infantry had a role in Chawinda. Every arm and service had a role. If I have not discussed infantry actions in detail it is not because infantry did nothing at Chawinda but simply because Chawinda was a tank dominated battle with artillery playing a crucial role. Had I been biased I would not have stated in various articles that the greatest tank commander of Pakistan Army at operational level was Maj Gen Iftikhar who was an infantry man. Similarly Ibrar whose conduct I pointed out as most decisive was again an infantry man .
l. If Brigadier Alam wants to highlight the infantry side of the battle he is free to write an article on the “Role of Infantry at Chawinda”.
m. I have also compiled some casualty figures of armour units in 1965 which will give the reader a fair idea of who did what and who suffered more or less:—
UNIT Killed casualties Battle area Remarks
4 CAVALRY 17 KHEM KARAN
5 HORSE 5 KHEM KARAN
6 LANCERS 20 KHEM KARAN
GUIDES 15 CHAWINDA Including 3 Officers
11 CAVALRY 34 CHAMB
CHAWINDA Including 1 Officer
12 CAVALRY 8 KHEM KARAN Did Traffic Control / Flank Protection etc. being Recce Regiment
13 LANCERS 14 CHAMB
JAURIAN
AKHNUR Including 3 Officers
15 LANCERS 8 KHEM KARAN
19 LANCERS 18 CHAWINDA Including 2 Officers
20 LANCERS Nil SIALKOT
22 CAVALRY 1 CHAWINDA
23 CAVALRY 18 10 DIVISION Including 2 Officers
24 CAVALRY 14 KHEM KARAN Including 2 Officers
25 CAVALRY 16 CHAWINDA
30 TDU 3 RAVI-SUTLEJ
CORRIDOR
31 TDU 7 SIALKOT
32 TDU 7 RAVI-SUTLEJ
CORRIDOR
33 TDU 9 JASSAR
Note:—These casualties were compiled personally and may not be wholly or totally accurate.
n. Lastly, Alam’s assertion that DJ is distorting history. A bit naive since articles published in journals are opinions of individual writers and not of the management. This is true for all journals whether it is Pakistan Army Journal or Command and Staff College Citadel.
o. Finally, Brigadier Alam’s letter was crude and lacked common courtesy that one would associate or expect from one holding the rank of a brigadier.
Lt Col M. Anwar’s Letter:—
a. I was not referring to 3 FF when I discussed Brig A.A Malik’s withdrawal request of 16 September. Hence, Col Anwar has misunderstood the point. Brig A.A Malik had requested permission to withdraw when Indian tanks had crossed the railway line on 16th September and occupied Buttur Dograndi and Sodreke. This fact was brought to light not by the much criticised Shaukat Riza but by the then GSO-2 of 6 Armoured Division Major (later General K.M Arif), first more bluntly in Pakistan Army Green Book-1993 and again a little tactfully in his recently published book Khaki Shadows. Thus no connection with 3 FF, an infantry unit which as far as I know suffered more casualties than any other infantry unit at Chawinda. 3 FF fought admirably but was launched thoughtlessly as brought out by Major Shamshad in his letter published in Sept 2001 DJ and consequently suffered enormous casualties at Sodreke-Buttur Dograndi area. Shamshad was the tank troop leader in support of 3 FF when it disastrously attacked Buttur Dograndi. In opinion of Shamshad, the attack had failed not due to any fault of 3 FF but because of poor planning by Commander 24 Brigade.
b. About the assertion of Col Anwar that official sources are cover ups, all that one can state is that if these are cover ups why don’t experts like Brigadier Alam and Farouk Adam or Col Anwar or Lt Gen Tariq devote some time to writing serious military history.
c. In my writings I have relied on official, unofficial and personal as well as Indian accounts. If someone has better knowledge of facts he is most welcome to apply his intellect and come out with a better account.
d. Anwar has a point that infantry was holding a firm base. I have not denied this anywhere. My emphasis, however, was on the real battle, the armour battle which was fought at Chawinda. It is up to a reader to form subjective conclusions.
e. Anwar states that infantry has been ignored, I contend that the real fact which has not been favourably received by some is that Brig A.A Malik has not been projected as much in my article as he had been before. Infantry, is an arm and I have great respect for it , A.A Malik was an individual who did well and rose to three star rank despite launching poorly planned counter attacks as brought out by
Gen Fazal i Muqeem in 1971 War as a GOC .
Lastly I want to quote a great captain of war :—
“ I am not publishing my memoirs, not theirs and we all know that no three honest witnesses of a brawl can agree on all the details. How much more likely will be the differences in a great battle covering a vast space of broken ground, when each division, brigade, regiment and even company naturally and honestly believes that it was the focus of the whole affair! Each of them won the battle. None ever lost. That was the fate of the old man who unhappily commanded”.
“Memoirs of General Sherman”
Lastly my humble submission; Chawinda was about operational leadership, not small unit actions or projecting individuals or maligning them. If someone feels otherwise it is his subjective opinion.
Kind regards
A.H Amin
In his letter in Defence Journal of Aug 2001, Mr . Amin says that in the Pak Army Journal (Summer 97) Brig Nisar does not mention any order coming his way from his Brigade Comd on 8 Sept 1965. I am no historian but some questions immediately come to mind viz. Does Col Nisar also mention that the Brigade Commander told him to “do something”? If not who is to be believed, Brig Nisar or Gen Riza. And if he was not told to “do something“, what major event galvanized him into taking this unilateral action against the enemy advance? Did he get information about the enemy advance himself, or did someone give it to him, and if so who? When he got his information, was he in the presence of the Brigade Commander , or was in wireless contact with him? And when he decided to strike out on his own, did he at least inform the Brigade? And if so what transpired; or did the rest of the Brigade merely follow 25 Cav through guess-work?
The point I want to make is that in order to be classified as “history“ we have to first establish whether 25 Cav was a part of a larger formation, or was acting in a vacuum. And if it was subordinate to
24 Brigade, did it take itself out of the Brigade ORBAT on its own, or did if take the Brigade under its own command. This relationship can only be settled by the communication between the two. So far it has been considered a settled fact beyond any controversy, that this Brigade and all its components fought an outstanding action. After all there have been M Ds and presentation on the subject for the last 36 years and most officers have had a chance to take part in one or another of these. And no adverse comment has come to tarnish the reputation of any officer of the brigade.
It is only recently that through one sentence of Maj Gen Shaukat Riza ‘s Book almost all infantry actions of this battle seem to have been nullified, and the brave conduct of the Bridge Commander has been found fit to be relegated to those who functioned below par.
I am afraid that Gen Riza’s Book is primarily the amalgam of various war diaries, with very little original research , “officially sponsored” to give the “official view“. A very good insight into its historical value and credibility lies in what it has to say regarding the change of command in Chamb, which is a scandal that has refused to be hushed up despite the best official efforts. On page 121 of the book Gen Riza blatantly states that change of Command in Chamb was pre-planned. And then he goes on to brazenly assert that this was confirmed by most officers in GHQ and 12 Div. He forgot that this was a deliberate, set-piece attack, the operation orders for which per force would have to be attended by GOC 7 Div, if the command was to change, and all the lower formations would have known about it, and at least some shred of documentary evidence of this effect would have survived, at least in GHQ. But there is not a word extant to corroborate this cover-up. And what is worst is that immediately after the war in Staff College under, Gen Riza was serving “a 12 Div officer” who was the GOC of this Division. He was Gen Akhtar Malik. At a time when even subalterns like me could question Gen Malik on this subject and get a candid reply, it is impossible to believe that Gen Riza did not know all details of this change from the horse’s mouth. And knowing this and then wilfully distorting history is deserving of the strongest opprobrium. And then DJ takes one line of this “history” and knocks out all infantry actions, and goes further to malign the commander of Chawinda Brigade! And now this is to pass for history?
Brig (Retd) Kamal Alam, TJ
House No. 5
Street # 25 F-7/2,
Islamabad
14 Dec 2001
To : The Editor Defence Journal
Karachi
Sir,
I refer to letter by Mr. Farouk Adam and Mr. Amin on the Battle of Chawinda (Defence Journal Aug 2001). In 1972, in company of some regimental at officers I met Gen A .A Malik in Mangla. The question of 3 F F came up. He said the heaviest attacks seemed to come wherever this unit was deployed. As such at one point he had to ask the Div HQ if there was any possibility for this unit to be relieved and rested. The Div HQ said this was not possible. War diaries are often not written immediately . There are often inaccuracies in them. Is it possible that this event is being referred to by both writers? At any rate 24 Brigade War Diary should also be consulted.
Mr. Amin quotes Gen Riza’s Book i.e. Brig Malik got on to ...............” From this it is obvious that it means the communication was by wireless or telephone. But I have attended an M D on this battle and also heard its narration from Brig Shinwari. Both were nearer to Farouk Adam’s explanation of events of
8 Sept. Mr. Amin says he has referred to “official sources” and “officially sponsored” GHQ account of this Battle. This is its weak point. Our “officially sponsored accounts” unfortunately have been cover-ups. Gen Riza wrote about such an important battle without interviewing any infantry CO, or any officer of the Brigade HQ, when they were all alivel! What sort of history is this?
I heard the talk by Lt Gen Tariq S. J to which Farouk Adam has referred. I have also heard him on the subject in person. He said that all units gave their very best but also that the Brigade Commander’s conduct, whose HQ was often in line of direct fire, was most inspiring.
After reading the original article one gets the impression that the whole battle was fought by Col Nisar and Maj Ahmed ably supported by Brig Amjad Chowdhry’s guns. It seems infantry was non-existant! Granted it was a tank battle and very well done by 25 Cav. But I can’t recall any DEFENSIVE tank battle over two weeks duration without an infantry firm base. And if Chawinda base did not hold, that would be the end of the tank battle also. But the infantry did hold, better than any infantry brigade on either side. And the Brigade Commander showed more pluck than any officer of his rank, also on either side. I am willing to stand corrected on this. And if not corrected, will not this make these units and Brig Malik deserving of credit?
Lt Col Mohammad Anwar
Flat No. 123 — C
Askari Housing Complex
Walton - Lahore
5 Dec 2001
REPLY TO CRITICISM OF BRIG ALAM AND COL ANWAR ON ARTICLE “BATTLE OF CHAWINDA” AND SUBSEQUENT LETTERS PUBLISHED IN DJ MARCH 2001 ISSUES AND AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER 2001 ISSUES
It is amusing as well as encouraging to note that this scribe’s article on Chawinda Battle of 1965 published in Defence Journal March 2001 issue continues to attract flak from critics!
The latest in the series are two letters , both written by retired officers . First of all I must clarify that my sole motivation in all writing has been to endeavour to write “what men did” rather than what “they ought ideally to have done” or what “someone later with the benefit of hindsight tried to portray , what they had done”. Thus the analysis of Chawinda Battle done with pure loyalty to service without any inter arm rivalry or nationalistic motivation. Pure and unadulterated military history filtered dispassionately separating fact from fiction and myth from reality. How far I succeeded is for readers to judge.
History as Frederick the Great once said can be well written only in a free country and ours has been continuously under civil or military dictators since 1958. Enters Defence Journal which in its resurrected form from 1997 picked up the gauntlet of serving as a medium of intellectual honesty and forthright criticism and published facts which were unpalatable for some and welcomed by the vast multitude. A breath of fresh air in a country reduced to intellectual stagnation because of years of censorship and intellectual persecution! I had written for the Pakistan Army Journal and Citadel but had left military history writing when in 1998 through a dear friend I discovered that there is a new Defence Journal in Karachi which is open to some critical writing!
I maintain as one great master of English prose said that “all history so far as it is not supported by contemporary evidence is romance”! Battle of Chawinda published in DJ March 2001 was thus not romance! What many in this country wrote and was outwardly military history was essentially “Romance”! Inspiring, superhuman but a myth promiscuously mixed with reality!
Chance plays a key role in battle and at Chawinda chance played a very important role! Nisar, when he deployed 25 Cavalry did not know what was in front of him ! KK Singh Commander 1st Indian Brigade also did not know what was in front of him! This mutual ignorance saved Pakistan on that crucial day ! Later heroes were created! I repeat “Heroes were created” ! This was what the article was all about !
What were the key facts? Most important tangible fact was “casualties” ! These were deliberately hidden since these would have let the cat out of the bag! Everyone would have discovered who really fought and who got gallantry awards on parochial,regimental or old boy links !How many were killed in the biggest military blunder “Operation Gibraltar”! This is Top Secret ! How many infantry men died at Chawinda? Again no mention of any figures! The real motivation here is not national interest but to preserve or more important to “guard reputations”
Brigadier Kamal Alam’s Letter
a. I stick to the assertion that the “broad front deployment” was done by Nisar and Nisar alone and Brigadier Abdul Ali Malik had no role in it. It is another matter that Nisar also did not know what was in front of him. It was like Jutland when both contending fleets were running towards each other at express train speed. Why Nisar behaved as he did and what actually happened even today is hard to understand, whatever anyone may claim now with the benefit of hindsight! Brigadier Alam offers no tangible proof that the actions of 25 Cavalry had anything to do with what Brig A.A Malik told Nisar. Nisar was told to “do something” and Nisar did something without the least clue of what was in front of him. The important thing is that Nisar did something rather than getting paralysed into inertia and inaction! I may add a personal note here. I understand that Alam’s elder brother Brig Mujahid Alam COS 31 Corps while this scribe was commanding 5 Independent Armoured Squadron was a fine soldier.
b. Alam raises the question about the controversial “Do Something” order by Brig A.A Malik to Lt Col Nisar CO 25 Cavalry. The same words were repeated by Nisar in his article published in Pakistan Army Journal in 1997. Then Alam raises the question about 25 Cavalry functioning in a vacuum. 24 Brigade had two infantry units, one which had been overrun and dispersed on 8th September i.e 3 FF and 2 Punjab which was at Chawinda. The crucial action took place at Gadgor few miles north of Chawinda in which 25 Cavalry faced the entire Indian 1st Armoured Division. This was an extraordinary situation and Nisar acted on his own best judgement since Malik had abdicated to Nisar by stating that he should do something. It is another thing that Nisar also did not know what was in front of him and acted boldly and unconventionally. Had he known what was in front of him he may have been paralysed by inertia and inaction! But this is speculation and some part of history always remains unfathomed and hidden! Nisar acted through sheer reflex and deployed his unit in an impromptu manner. The fire fight which took place at Gadgor between 0900 hours and 1200 hours was a pure tank versus tank affair. 25 Cavalry versus two leading tank regiments of Indian 1st Armoured Division! Thus the Indian Armoured Corps historian stated “The Armoured Brigade had been blocked by two squadrons of Pattons and in the first encounter had lost more tanks than the enemy had...the worst consequence of the days battle was its paralysing effect on the minds of the higher commanders. It took them another 48 hours to contemplate the next move. This interval gave Pakistanis time to deploy their 6th Armoured Division...in fact the golden opportunity that fate had offered to the 1st Armoured Division to make worthwhile gains had been irretrievably lost” (Refers-Pages-393 & 394-History of Indian Armoured Corps-Gurcharan Singh Sandhu-Vision Books-Delhi-1990). Thus the Indians acknowledged “This regiment’s (25 Cavalry) performance was certainly creditable because it alone stood between the 1st Indian Armoured division and its objective, the MRL canal”.
(Refers-Page-395-Ibid).
c. At Gadgor on 8th September it was 25 Cavalry and 25 Cavalry alone which saved the day. Major Shamshad a direct participant has already stated on record that SJs were awarded to some officers for an attack in which not a single man was killed on both sides!
d. 25 Cavalry was part of 24 Brigade but all that Nisar its CO did on the crucial 8th September at Gadgor was based on his own judgement. On 9th and 10th September no fighting took place as Indians had withdrawn their armoured division to the crossroads. On 10th September, 6 Armoured Division took over and 24 Brigade was a part of 6 Armoured Division. On 8th September there was a vacuum and Nisar acted in a sitaution which can be classified as one characterised by “absence of clear and precise orders”!
e. Shaukat Riza’s book is basically a compilation of existing facts. It has historical value since Riza was allowed access to official records.
f. The change of command aspect about which Alam asserts is correct and was officially hushed up but why should Shaukat Riza have any sympathy for the armoured corps of 1960s which was arrogant and looked down on artillery as I personally witnessed right till 1980s as a young officer in Kharian and Multan? Artillery officers were never welcomed in armoured corps unit messes unless real exceptions based on personal ties and armour officers rarely visited artillery messes.
g. Chawinda was a tank battle, thus armour suffered more casualties. On the other hand Lahore was an infantry battle where the indomitable 1st Baluch lost something like around 30 killed in battle , more casualties than most infantry units in the much trumpeted Grand Slam.
h. Now I offer some figures for the readers to form their own conclusions.
KILLED-CASUALTIES GRAND SLAM
UNIT KILLED CASUALTIES
6 PUNJAB 9
9 PUNJAB 15
13 PUNJAB 24
14 PUNJAB 3
15 PUNJAB 8
8 BALOCH 10
11 CAVALRY 19
13 LANCERS 14
REFERS-PAGE-109-PAKISTAN BHARAT JANG-1965-COL MUKHTAR GILLANI-RAWALPINDI-JULY 1998 AND UNIT SOURCES 13 LANCERS AND 11 CAVALRY
The above casualties prove that Grand Slam was both an infantry and armour battle yet armour suffered proportionately more casualties since the effective battle strength of a tank unit is half that of an infantry unit. 14 Punjab lost just 3 killed while 10 Guides Cavalry at Chawinda lost 3 killed in officers alone apart from 12 OR/JCOs killed! 11 Cavalry lost more in killed casualties in 1965 War than any of the above units of the Grand Slam i.e 34 killed. No fault of infantry since Chawinda was an essentially a tank battle.
i. Brigadier Alam does not give any figures which prove that infantry suffered more casualties at Chawinda. I have already admitted in my letter that the only infantry unit which bore the brunt of Indian assault was 3 FF on the 8th September. 3 FF aside the brunt of the attack at Chawinda was borne by armour units since Chawinda was a tank battle. At Lahore, the brunt of the attack was faced by infantry since Lahore i.e 10 Division battle was an essentially infantry battle. Thus, there were units like 1st Baloch and 16 Punjab which suffered tremendous casualties.1st Baloch suffering casualties of 31 killed in 10 Division Area (Refers-Page-139-Col Gillani-Op Cit). 16 Punjab suffering casualties of 106 killed and 70 missing most of whom were killed (more than total of all regular infantry units in Grand Slam) (Refers-Page-138-Col Gillani). On the other hand there were formations which in words of Colonel Mukhtar Gillani exaggerated the fighting and suffered nominal casualties like the 103 Brigade in 10 Division area (Refers Page-143-Col Gillani).
j. Even at formation level Chawinda was not a big battle in terms of casualties since the Indian 1 Corps suffered less casualties than 11 Indian Corps in Ravi Sutlej Corridor.
k. Brigadier Alam has mixed inter arm rivalry with operational leadership and personalities. Infantry had a role in Chawinda. Every arm and service had a role. If I have not discussed infantry actions in detail it is not because infantry did nothing at Chawinda but simply because Chawinda was a tank dominated battle with artillery playing a crucial role. Had I been biased I would not have stated in various articles that the greatest tank commander of Pakistan Army at operational level was Maj Gen Iftikhar who was an infantry man. Similarly Ibrar whose conduct I pointed out as most decisive was again an infantry man .
l. If Brigadier Alam wants to highlight the infantry side of the battle he is free to write an article on the “Role of Infantry at Chawinda”.
m. I have also compiled some casualty figures of armour units in 1965 which will give the reader a fair idea of who did what and who suffered more or less:—
UNIT Killed casualties Battle area Remarks
4 CAVALRY 17 KHEM KARAN
5 HORSE 5 KHEM KARAN
6 LANCERS 20 KHEM KARAN
GUIDES 15 CHAWINDA Including 3 Officers
11 CAVALRY 34 CHAMB
CHAWINDA Including 1 Officer
12 CAVALRY 8 KHEM KARAN Did Traffic Control / Flank Protection etc. being Recce Regiment
13 LANCERS 14 CHAMB
JAURIAN
AKHNUR Including 3 Officers
15 LANCERS 8 KHEM KARAN
19 LANCERS 18 CHAWINDA Including 2 Officers
20 LANCERS Nil SIALKOT
22 CAVALRY 1 CHAWINDA
23 CAVALRY 18 10 DIVISION Including 2 Officers
24 CAVALRY 14 KHEM KARAN Including 2 Officers
25 CAVALRY 16 CHAWINDA
30 TDU 3 RAVI-SUTLEJ
CORRIDOR
31 TDU 7 SIALKOT
32 TDU 7 RAVI-SUTLEJ
CORRIDOR
33 TDU 9 JASSAR
Note:—These casualties were compiled personally and may not be wholly or totally accurate.
n. Lastly, Alam’s assertion that DJ is distorting history. A bit naive since articles published in journals are opinions of individual writers and not of the management. This is true for all journals whether it is Pakistan Army Journal or Command and Staff College Citadel.
o. Finally, Brigadier Alam’s letter was crude and lacked common courtesy that one would associate or expect from one holding the rank of a brigadier.
Lt Col M. Anwar’s Letter:—
a. I was not referring to 3 FF when I discussed Brig A.A Malik’s withdrawal request of 16 September. Hence, Col Anwar has misunderstood the point. Brig A.A Malik had requested permission to withdraw when Indian tanks had crossed the railway line on 16th September and occupied Buttur Dograndi and Sodreke. This fact was brought to light not by the much criticised Shaukat Riza but by the then GSO-2 of 6 Armoured Division Major (later General K.M Arif), first more bluntly in Pakistan Army Green Book-1993 and again a little tactfully in his recently published book Khaki Shadows. Thus no connection with 3 FF, an infantry unit which as far as I know suffered more casualties than any other infantry unit at Chawinda. 3 FF fought admirably but was launched thoughtlessly as brought out by Major Shamshad in his letter published in Sept 2001 DJ and consequently suffered enormous casualties at Sodreke-Buttur Dograndi area. Shamshad was the tank troop leader in support of 3 FF when it disastrously attacked Buttur Dograndi. In opinion of Shamshad, the attack had failed not due to any fault of 3 FF but because of poor planning by Commander 24 Brigade.
b. About the assertion of Col Anwar that official sources are cover ups, all that one can state is that if these are cover ups why don’t experts like Brigadier Alam and Farouk Adam or Col Anwar or Lt Gen Tariq devote some time to writing serious military history.
c. In my writings I have relied on official, unofficial and personal as well as Indian accounts. If someone has better knowledge of facts he is most welcome to apply his intellect and come out with a better account.
d. Anwar has a point that infantry was holding a firm base. I have not denied this anywhere. My emphasis, however, was on the real battle, the armour battle which was fought at Chawinda. It is up to a reader to form subjective conclusions.
e. Anwar states that infantry has been ignored, I contend that the real fact which has not been favourably received by some is that Brig A.A Malik has not been projected as much in my article as he had been before. Infantry, is an arm and I have great respect for it , A.A Malik was an individual who did well and rose to three star rank despite launching poorly planned counter attacks as brought out by
Gen Fazal i Muqeem in 1971 War as a GOC .
Lastly I want to quote a great captain of war :—
“ I am not publishing my memoirs, not theirs and we all know that no three honest witnesses of a brawl can agree on all the details. How much more likely will be the differences in a great battle covering a vast space of broken ground, when each division, brigade, regiment and even company naturally and honestly believes that it was the focus of the whole affair! Each of them won the battle. None ever lost. That was the fate of the old man who unhappily commanded”.
“Memoirs of General Sherman”
Lastly my humble submission; Chawinda was about operational leadership, not small unit actions or projecting individuals or maligning them. If someone feels otherwise it is his subjective opinion.
Kind regards
A.H Amin
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