Pakistani decision makers who always had cold feet - 1947 TILL TODAY 2 APRIL 2022


 




Friday, December 8, 2017

Colonel Tommy Massaud Khan Sattis Bold Proposal and Pakistani decision makers who always had cold feet

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Colonel Tommy Massaud Khan Sattis Bold Proposal and Pakistani decision makers who always had cold feet

There is one extremely important event which has generally been ignored  by most Pakistani military historians including Shaukat Riza.This was a conference held between 30th October and 4th November. Brigadier Akbar Khan the military man incharge of the raiders operations had returned to Pindi after a visit to the frontline at Srinagar. The tribesmen had not yet been repulsed and were planning infiltration operations with the aim of capturing Srinagar airfield. Akbar Khan’s analysis about the operational solution to the problem of tribesmen’s inability to attack well entrenched Indian infantry, supported by aircraft and artillery was to provide the tribesmen with armoured cars.

 Major Masud from 11 Cavalry stationed at Rawalpindi volunteered to take his own squadron’s armoured cars to Srinagar, on his own initiative, without informing any superior headquarter. Akbar Khan states in his book ‘Raiders in Kashmir’ that  Major Masud said that the armoured cars would go without official permission, at his own risk and that the men would be in civilian clothes. This fact is proved by two independent authorities who were not from armoured corps and  thus had no  ulterior motivation  or desire to project 11 Cavalry.

One was General Akbar who was present at the conference and the other was Brigadier Amjad Ali  Khan Chaudhry who was a gunner, and was also present at the same conference. (20) Akbar states that as the conference was coming to an end Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan a Muslim League leader and  Central Government Minister entered the room. Brigadier Sher Khan who was the Director Military Operations had also joined the discussion. This, Raja Ghazanfar (despite being from a so-called martial area)  was horrified about the armoured cars proposal, and according to both Akbar Khan and Amjad Chaudhry opposed the idea. He was supported by Brigadier Sher (Lion) Khan! Both the Minister and the Lion Hearted brigadier feared that such a step would lead to an open war between Pakistan and India. (21)




Amjad Chaudhry states that one of the participants at this conference a Muslim League minister Raja Ghazanfar Ali  Khan  even voiced an apprehension that the unruly tribesmen may get unruly and damage the Maharajas palace at Srinagar ! (22)




Thus in the end Akbar Khan who was not directly in charge of the operations of tribesmen was overruled by a  pacifist Minister more keen to enjoy ministerial perks and a paper tiger brigadier wearing the mask of the high-sounding appointment of Director Military Operations!

The  only difference between India and Pakistan was not whether one side possessed armoured cars or not, but  the simple fact that while Mr Jinnah did not have any able Muslim deputy to advise him about military affairs (whether Punjabi, Hindustani or Pathan)


Major General Akbar Khan ,the real hero of the 1947-48 War.A DSO of Burma and the architect of philosophy of armed insurrection by aiding non state actors as state proxies.His ideas of use of non state actors as advanced in his writings were picked up much later and practised in Afghanistn,NEFA and Kashmir




Nehru was assisted by a much larger team of more resolute, more intellectually capable Hindu deputies like Patel  who ensured that armoured cars of 7th Light Cavalry; under command  Lieutenant N.G David; did reach Srinagar area on 7th  November and inflicted on the poorly armed tribesmen equipped with bolt action rifles a defeat at what the Indians themselves call the decisive battle of Shalateng!

It may be noted that on the night of 2/3 November the tribesmen had successfully infiltrated north of the Indian main position at Pattan and had reached Shalateng in the rear of Pattan and a little to the north of Srinagar. Sen the Indian brigade commander countered this move by ordering 1 Sikh to pull back from Patan and to take a position at milestone four astride the Srinagar-Baramula road. By 6th November a large number of tribesmen who had been slowly infiltrating since 3rd November had gathered at Shalateng.


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Battle of Chamb 1971

Battle of Chamb 1971

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