US COUNTER IED STRATEGY WAS A FAILURE IN AFGHANISTAN WAS A FAILURE
US COUNTER IED STRATEGY WAS A FAILURE IN AFGHANISTAN WAS A FAILURE
US COUNTER IED STRATEGY IN AFGHANISTAN WAS A FAILURE
WE CARRIED OUT A SMALL CONSULTANCY ASSIGNMENT FOR A CLIENT.
RESULTS CANNOT BE DISCLOSED DUE TO NON DISCLOSURE AGREEMENT BUT SOME CONCLUSIONS ARE DISCUSSED IN MY BOOK -IED DRONES AND SUICIDE BOMBIN IN AFANISTAN
AGHA H AMIN
Analyzing Quixotic and Myopic views of so called leading western analysts about the USA and NATO failure in Afghanistan https://www.amazon.com/dp/B09TN493BV/ref=cm_sw_r_tw_dp_R8Y2HQVS7XAPRG21V004 via @amazon
Theo Farrell's Book "Unwinnable" Critically Examined and Reviewed by Agha H A... https://www.amazon.com/dp/B09TRKYVF5/ref=cm_sw_r_tw_dp_TGSBDJDA275QA41FVC7K via @amazon
It is a great mystery why the US/NATO decided to take the war to Helmand. A better option would have been to simply defoliate the poppy crops using chemical agents and to concentrate on mining and fencing the Afghan Pakistan and Afghan Iran Border in Helmand and Kandahar provinces. A far cheaper , economical and cost effective option than building Camps Leatherneck ,Dwyer etc and wasting valuable military lives in Helmand and Kandahar ? It is beyond the scope of this short work to research why the US went into Helmand . Was it to monopolise and control the vast drug country which Taliban linked drug mafia was controlling or was it to inflict a decisive military defeat on Taliban. Drugs were not eliminated as this was never a US objective . Taliban were not annihilated as US force ratios were too low and the US failed to severe the Talibans strategic line of logistics based in Pakistan. It is a great mystery why the US military established huge military presence right in the heart of drugs in Helmand and did nothing to eradicated drugs.Interestingly both US and Pakistan protected select drug mafia groups as both in all probability used narcotics to finance part of the war. Drug seizures declined radically after 9/11 in both Afghanistan and Pakistan and the period 2001-13 was the best era of life for the drug barons of all religions and ethnicities in Af Pak,UAE and Europe. In 2008 the US went in Helmand in force by establishing Camp Leatherneck. A US military contractor contacted me for boring wells in Helmand and in the process sent me an excellent map marking US camps in Helmand. It appears that establishment of Camp Leatherneck near Khanishin was viewed with extreme suspicion by the Pakistani military and 2008 saw a major surge in Taliban activity in targeting US troops with IEDs. It appears that the Pakistani military thought that if the Taliban did not exert greater pressure on the US troops in Helmand , US alleged support to Baloch insurgents would multiply as well as alleged US support to the Pakistani Taliban in FATA.These were seen as a NATO proxy to punish Pakistan for its covert support to Afghan Taliban.
IED,Drones and Suicide Bomber Warfare in Afghanistan and PakistanPaperback – September 21, 2013
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IED,DRONES AND SUICIDE BOMBER WARFARE IN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN
Reflections of one who saw events from close quarters
Agha Humayun Amin
Dedication
Dedicated to all foot soldiers and fighters on all sides who fought these wars in vain and to the ordinary people of Afghanistan and Pakistan who suffered and will suffer
Introduction
With friend and co author Colonel David Osinski in front of NATO Headquarters Kabul , 29 June 2010
This is narrative of a soldier who identifies with all soldiers all over the world regardless of race , religion or class and seeds soldiers as a class misused by crafty politicians for furthering personal ambitions and narrow agendas.
An attempt has been made to present things as I saw them without any axe to grind.
While warfare has seen many changes the human actor remains the constant factor.
IEDs became famous in Iraq War of 2003 and later acquired greater notoriety in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Main impact of IEDs is that they have immensely increased the cost of war for bigger states and states in general and made waging war more effective at a lower cost for non state actors as well as smaller states.
According to Peter Singer writings posted on Brookings the United States has spent roughly $17 billion on various anti-IED gear over the last decade, and that's not counting the $45 billion spent on mine-resistant vehicles.
More than the cost IEDs have shattered the basic confidence that any soldier has in himself and in the environment in which he operates.
Many NATO soldiers who I met in Afghanistan regretted the fact that they were fighting against an enemy who they rarely ever saw with their own eyes !
This narrative is a personal narrative also because of a many centuries old family connection with Afghanistan and my personal connection with Afghanistan since 1978 and with Pakistan since birth.
Many of the events that I discuss in this narrative have a direct connection with what I saw as a contractor in Afghanistan , particularly from 2004 till to date.
Chapter One
IEDs in Afghanistan and the Opposing Strategic Debates in NATO Command and Pakistani Military Command circles'
According to the icasualties.org data the first IED attack victim in Afghanistan was US Army Staff Sergeant Brian.T Craig killed by an IED at Kandahar on 15 April 2002 alongwith three other US personnel i.e Staff Sergeant Galewski, Justin J , Sergeant Maugans, Jamie O , and Sergeant First Class Romero, Daniel A.
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Chapter Ten
Conclusion
While US invasion of Afghanistan was a strategic act which placed the US in a central position from where it could strike a wide variety of objectives , US strategy after 2001 invasion degenerated into a directionless river which peters out into a sandy desert and cannot produce anything useful , productive or palatable.
The US failed in all of the following objectives in Afghanistan :--
1. Destroy the Afghan Taliban and various Islamist groups with an extremist agenda.
2. Dominate the Central Asian Republics from where the US was simply kicked out or contained by the Russians despite initial successes in Uzbekistan and Kirgizistan.
3. Make any offensive progress against Iran where the Iranian Baloch were an ideal strategic asset that the US could have exploited.
4. Arm twist and pressurize Pakistan into not providing sanctuary and logistic support to Taliban , other Islamist groups etc.
5. Fence and block the Afghan Pakistan border opposite Pakistani Balochistan province and interdict Taliban logistics using which maximum casualties were inflicted on the US troops deployed in Afghanistan.
6. Create alternative states in Afghanistan or Pakistan which could replace existing Pakistani and Afghanistan states as a better and more reliable US ally despite the fact that many ethnic groups in both Af Pak were pro US and looked at the US as a savior and benefactor.
On the Islamist side following lessons stand out :--
1. Non state actors cannot win wars without support of a major state actor which was non existent in this case. Although Pakistan at the covert level supported Afghan Taliban , the very secrecy and discreteness of the support made its impact limited.
2. IED warfare could discourage a major state actor from waging war but could not win a war itself. What would follow a US withdrawal from Afghanistan would be a new civil war and greater chaos.
3. Suicide bombings are a failed method od waging low intensity conflict. They are difficult to execute
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