Carthage was the western Mediterranean's first superpower, long before Rome, and her military history was powerful, eventful, and chequered even before her 'Punic Wars' against Rome. Although characterized in the surviving sources and modern studies as a predominantly mercantile state, Carthage fought many wars, both aggressive and defensive, before and in between the contests with the Roman parvenus. The Greek states of Sicily, above all Syracuse under its tyrants Dionysius the Great and then Agathocles, were her most resolute opponents, but in North Africa itself, in Sardinia, and later on in Spain she won--and sometimes lost--major wars. This is the first full-length study dedicated to these other wars which furthered Carthage's interests for over half a millennium. The book is based firmly and analytically on the ancient sources, and among many insights is that Carthage, though usually considered a naval power, did more fighting on land than at sea and with more s...
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A Amin likes this1965 was a failure of offence and triumph of defence. Except in Grand Slam where initial overwhelming superiority enabled Pakistan to achieve a breakthrough, on both sides defence triumphed as a way of war. Both the armies were more used to defence because of British colonial military experience and comparative relative lack of difference in weaponry also ensured that defence triumphed over attack. Thus the attackers failed at Gadgor, Chawinda, Assal, Uttar and Valtoha regardless of religion of the defender! Both the armies lacked the dynamism to conduct attack a far more complicated form of war and totally outside the pre-1947 experience of fighting divisional and brigade level defensive battles till overwhelming superiority enabled the Britisher to resume the offensive as at Alalamein and that too with non-Indian formations like the purely British armoured divisions or in Burma where the British-Indians had overwhelming superiority against the Japanese in tanks and air.
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A frontal attack against an enemy who has not been neutralised by artillery fire or surprised by following a stratagem has rarely succeed. In 1815 at New Orleans when the British Army was one of the finest armies of the world; a similar frontal attack had led to one of the most disastrous repulses in British military annals! Thus the British suffered 2037 casualties including their commanding general killed while the US defenders suffered just 61 casualties47!
It is interesting that to note that tank is such a versatile weapon system; that the worst possible tank in defence can play havoc with the best tank when it comes to firing at an advancing tank from a stationery defensive position. The Italians in North Africa had the technically speaking most pathetic tanks of WW Two. During the battle of 'Crusader' in November 1941 the British 22nd Armoured Brigade equipped with the technically overwhemingly superior 'Crusader' Tanks with 2 Pounder gun and 49mm frontal armour lost 40 out of 160 tanks when it gallantly but frontally charged the far inferior Italian Ariete Division equipped with M-13 tanks! Most of the tanks were destroyed by anti-tank guns which were closely integrated with Italian tanks! In July 1944 SS Obersturmfuehrer Michael Wittman was able to stop the British 7th Armoured Division with just four Tiger Tanks, annihilating their complete advance guard, knocking out 25 tanks, 14 carriers and 14 half tracks! Wittman did so without charging, but by conducting a highly imaginative defensive battle!
The Battle of Chamb was a convincing proof that keeping in view comparative equipment resources etc tanks in defence were a much more formidable weapon than in offence. A tank advance even with artillery support was near suicidal when the enemy in front was well entrenched and had sited its defence well. Thus while 11 Cavalry swiftly advanced till Mandiala because no tanks were covering this approach; armour failed to achieve a breakthrough on 04 and 05 December. Some critics condemned this employment of armour; however it was unavoidable. In the first phase wherever tanks were launched there were bound to be casualties and in Chamb due to the dominating ridges the defender was ideally placed. To cause dislocation some attrition in terms of tank casualties was thus inevitable. The Indian commander on the other hand underestimated the power of defence. Thus in the initial discussions before the war General Candeth in his own words advanced the mistaken viewpoint that ÒPositions west of Tawi were not tactically sound (Refers-Candeth-The Western Front-earlier quoted-page-75). Tactically there was nothing wrong with the Indian positions as amply demonstrated by the performance of Indian 191 Brigade in blocking the advance of four infantry brigades in the first four days of the war. The Indian failure in losing Chamb was entirely a command failure at divisional level and Chamb was not lost by I91 Indian brigade but by 10 Indian Divisional Commander. The tank casualties of 1971 merely hint at a trend in favour of Defence as the stronger form of warfare as witnessed in the limited success of armour attacks even in the 1973 war and in the Iran-Iraq war. The Kuwait war cannot be cited as an example of success of tanks in attack since the contest was one sided.
The dilemma which faced General Eftikhar was that casualties were unavoidable. Someone with some tank squadrons had to move forward and create a dislocation in the Indian defensive posture so as to fix the enemy commanders attention and create conditions which would lead to commitment of reserves finally leading to a situation which offered a vulnerable area through which own armour could breakthrough and paralyse the will of the enemy. The frontal attack on Mandiala and the high tank casualties around Phagla Gurha and Sukhtao Nullah were a pre-requisite for the success later on achieved at Chak Pandit. The relentless attacks of 23 Division in Mandiala area on 04 and 05 December convinced the Indians that the Pakistanis would continue banging their heads against Mandiala. Just like the Indian Armoured Division had done at Chawinda. Thus the sudden appearance of armour at Chak Pandit caused a mental paralysis and the Indians lost the will to fight. General Eftikhar in words of Clausewitz ÒBy strategem made the Indians commit the errors of understanding which at last, flowing into one result, suddenly change the nature of things in his eyesÓ (Refers-On War earlier quoted-page.274).
The defender lays down the first laws of war, in words of an author he forces the attacker to establish his plan ... But defence is the weaker form of warfare in short conflicts like Indo-Pak wars where resources are few and it is a nearly impossible task to change posture from defence to offence as was the Indian plan/thus after 10 December though 23 Division was greatly exhausted the Indians could not regain what they had lost. Had they taken their main defence on Tawi rather than west of Tawi as Candeth wanted; they may even have lost Pallanwala. Much more strength of will, intellect and courage is required to fight a successful offensive battle. 10 Indian DivisionÕs initial defensive battle was a masterpiece effort in terms of 191 Indian Brigades conduct in facing four advancing Brigades. Where the Indians failed was in terms of the conduct of battle at the divisional level; placing of reserves; launching of timely counterattacks etc etc.
The lessons of 1971 War were not digested by Asian countries.Indian Army on the Western Front had failed throughout the war to achieve any breakthrough on the Western Theatre.Similarly the Indian efforts to attack positions in East Pakistan mostly failed. This lesson was convincingly once again proved in the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-88 when both sides failed to achieve any breakthrough.East Pakistan where the Indian Army did achieve a breakthrough was an exceptional case where conditions were highly unnatural and where superiority was overwhelming. Thus the validity of Indian analyst Brigadier Sodhi's conclusion that "the success of the army in Bangladesh was mainly due to peculiar conditions prevailing there,which are difficult to imagine obtaining in any future war" and that "the true performance of the army was in the Western Theatre"45 whereas per Sodhi the Indian Army failed to overcome any main enemy position. I am not implying that things would have remained the same if all three corps committed in East Pakistan had arrived. However, even then the cost would have been high. One which Indira Gandhi was not willing to pay. Thus the unilateral Indian ceasefire of 17th December 1971!
No attack succeeded anywhere except in Chamb where the general officer commanding was of an exceptionally high calibre. The defender was stronger and the Chawinda experience of smaller forces defeating larger forces when smaller forces was convincingly proved when three Pakistani tank regiments miserably failed to make a dent against one Indian tank regiment. All battles where any side did well were battles in which the side which performed better was in defence. This was because of the immense lethality of modern weapons and increased ground friction. Thus 6 FF inflicted maximum casualties on Indians while it was defending Sabuna Drain rather than when it attacked it. Shakargarh again was triumph of defence.
Use of Reserves
Here at the Battle of Inkerman British infantry armed with French "Minie Rifles" annihilated some 15,000 men out of a total Russian force of 27,000. In this battle the Russians were attacking the British in close order formation in vogue before the advent of Minie Rifle on the battlefield460. In Prussia the German General Moltke the Elder could not help commenting that "The English bullets simply could not miss"461. This was not all, the new rifles to be effectively used required a soldier who had a good basic education and reasonable IQ because range between 100 to 500 metres was not easy to estimate by naked eye method which we call "JD" or "Judging Distance" in the army. Thus it was observed that in the US Civil War an average Union Army Soldier on the average consumed 900 pounds of lead and 240 pounds of powder to kill his enemy i.e. the Confederate Army soldier! This average figure it must be noted was for killing just "one Confederate soldier"462. During the Prusso - Danish war of 1864 it was observed that the Prussian Dreyse Rifle which was superior to Minie Rifle. During this war in a small unit action 124 Prussian soldiers convincingly defeated 180 Danish soldiers by virtue of superior weaponry i.e. the Dreyse Rifle. Thus the Prussians started firing from 250 metres range and by the time the Danish were at the 150 metres line the Prussians troops had fired thrice ensuring that the Danish attack broke up and the Danish withdrew463. In another action in the Prusso - Danish war the Prussians opened fire on a Danish attacking unit at the range of 250 paces. After advancing for 100 more paces the Danish broke up and withdrew after having suffered 50% casualties464.