East Pakistan 1971 - Pakistan Army STAFF OFFICERS IMPRESSIONS -MARCH 1971 TO SEPTEMBER 1971

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account of a crucial and traumatic phase of Pakistani history

INTRODUCTION

This is a brief account of a crucial and traumatic phase of Pakistani history based on conversations with my father who was a grade two operations general staff officer in Pakistans 16 Division from 1969 to 1971.

The principal historical value of this account is in understanding perceptions of Pakistani military at the time of the East Pakistan Crisis of 1971 that led to creation of Bangladesh.

THE ACCOUNT

I was posted GSO 2 Operations in end  July 1969 and took over Aug 1969 . Major General Nawazish was GOC but left in October 1969.

16 Divisions operational role was defence of Afghan Border.

There were three brigades , 34 Brigade (Brig M Shafi-FF)  , 124 Brigade (Brigade Nur-FF)  205 –RYK Brigade (Brig Durrani –FF) , 25 Indep Brigade (Brig Ameer Hamza) ,Sulaimanke .

All brigades were located at Quetta.

Comd artillery was Brig Ansari.

Armour- 33 Cavalry.

As stated Maj Gen Nawazish left in Oct 1969.Brigadier Ansari a highly mediocre officer who was commander artillery held acting command of 16 Division on departure of Nawazish.

Major General A.B Awan  (Arty/Avn) came end 1969 and left in January Feb 1970 for Comdt Staff College.In the style of those days he came via Kabul driving from Pindi via Torkham.

An exercise  was held in Usta Mohd (watermanship trg) .Everyone was supposed to cross Kirthar Branch . An OR drowned.

A.B Awan came to see the exercise. There was no accommodation .We requested the Deputy Commissioner of Jacobadabad DC who asked Mr Mohibullah Shah the assistant commissioner of Usta Mohammad .He  vacated his room in a mud house where the GOC slept at night  while the divisional staff slept outside.There was simply no concept of air conditioners in those days.

Feb 1970- Maj Gen Sharif commanded 16 Division  for three months. Sharif was a forced bachelor as he had some family issues and was not living with his wife.Sharif was deadly weight conscious and only consumed tea in the tea break. Tea break was served only once a week.

People were afraid of him specially GSO 1 Lieutenant Colonel Ejaz (Punjab) , AQ Lt Col EAS Bukhari  , while Col Abdullah Saeed was in 303 Tribunal in Pindi.

My relationship was cordial and I was asked by all staff officers to discuss all issues with him as no one was willing to enter his office.

One day the GOC asked me to tell his ADC to have his dinner with him at the GOC house where the ADC had an annexe.The ADC a Punjab regiment officer refused as he said that the GOC was too dry and unbearable company !

Sharif was instrumental in elections being held peacefully.Akbar Bugti was the only politician who visited him frequently.

April 1970 Maj Gen Nazar Hussain Shah 3^rd Baluch came from Joint Staff Headquarters Pindi.Col Staff was Abdullah Saeed  (IMA-PMA) till Oct 1970 . Later succeeded by Col Akbar (Arty/6 PMA).

GSO 1 Lt Col Ejaz went to Fort Leavenworth  and succeeded by Lt Col Ghulam Dastagir.

At that time FC was headed by full colonel.

16 Division staff was sent  to Jacobabad for anti Bugti operation against Bugti tribesmen who used to loot crops in Sindh .We were told by the Intelligence that the Bugti tribesmen forcibly had sex with  sindhi women and the children born through this affair  were called Marata Bugti.We stayed in Circuit House at Jacoababad but the operation  was called off by the GOC Major General Sharif as unnecessary .The DC at that time was Fatima surayas brother, later probably sacked in ZA Bhutto tenure.

36 Baluch (R and S ) commanded by Aslam Beg from 1969 to 1970 . Aslam Beg was a good friend and we had shared accommodation as neighbours in Lahores Napier Hotel in 1962-64 where he was a brigade major and I was serving in 4 Engineer Battalion .He was posted  to Kharian 9 Div  and later went to East Pakistan and later came to 1971 war course.

Army held very fair election in 1970  in Baluchistan and locals really appreciated it.

In Dec 1970 GOC Maj Gen Nazar Hussain Shah 3^rdBaluch took over as GOC.Disturbances in East Pakistan had commenced.One day he called me and said that as you know the GSO I Lt Col Ghulam Dastagir is a Bengali and I don’t want to put him in a difficult situation.

Top secret SITREP from GHQ will come and you will receive from SIG Centre and not show to GSO 1 .

 Sitreps started coming about trouble in east Pakistan.Only two persons saw ,myself and GOC as there was no colonel staff and were filed in safe.

 In early 1969 Yahya Khan issued secret instructions that ML may be imposed and GOC 16 Division would be MLA.

In Dec 1970 an Ex without troops was held  in Muzaffargarh .

General  Yahya Khan came and bridge on Chenab was made by 1^st Engr Bn comd by Lt Col Syed Jawwad Hussain Naqvi.

Col Staff Akbar , GSO 2 Ops and GSO 2 Int went and 2 Corps GSO 1 ops was shah rafi alam.

In Jan 1971 Yahya Khan announced LFO.

Assembly  session postponed and strong reaction in east Pakistan commenced . We frequently discussed this issue and most thought thast assembly session must be called with or without Mr ZA Bhuttos agreement.

On 1^st Mar 1971 order came from GHQ that 34 Bde  (three battalions- 27 FF ,22 Baluch , 4 FF) should move to East Pakistan.Move from Quetta to Karachi by rail and Karachi to dacca by air-Only rifles , company and battalion weapons and wireless were carried.No artillery was taken.

First week of March 1971 the move took place. 57 Bde holding DACCA city.

On 10^th March 1971 205 Brigade moved to Chittagong.

On 26 Mar 1971 HQ 16 Div asked to move.

124 Bde stayed in Quetta.35 FF stationed in Chaman.Maj Basit Ali Khan (8 PMA) a very fine officer  was BM 205 Bde.

Nasrullah FF-ssg  was BM 34 Bde. Jalil Bengali was 25 Bde BM .

26 Mar 1971 reached Dacca (6 hours) early morning.

Eastern command received us and  our arrangements were made at the MNA Hostel which also housed  34 Bde mess. AC did not exist at that time and I am surprised today when I see the amount of ACs being used in the army .

ISSB HQ given to 16 Div as HQ in Dacca.

Next day 27 March 1971  we were ordered to go to Rangpur . We travelled in a 5 Seater  with ceiling of 8000 feet belonging to plant protection. The GOC , Colonel Staff and myself travelled . The instructions were that Rajshahi division  would be under comd 16 div.

At Rangpur we landed on a football field as there was  no airfield.

 

Abdullah Khan Malik Bde Comd 23 Bde received us . 29 C was commanded  by Lt col sagheer.Rangpur absolutely calm.

Same day we came back to Dacca.

Dinajpur 26 FF part of 23 Bde absolutely peaceful.

34 Bde was grouped with 57 Bde in Dacca.

1^st April 57 bde (Brig Jahanzeb Arbab)  ordered to move to Pabna –Ishaurdi Nator Rajshahi Santahar and come to Bogra.

All population used to disappear before army reached and there was no fighting.

34 Bde ordered 2nd april to follow 57 Bde. 34 Bde established HQ in Nator .34 Brigade  Commander who was a handsome man  was sacked for cowardice and replaced by Brig Aslam Niazi famous for being a phenomenally  heavy drinker.

25 Punjab CO Lt Col Shafqat Baloch in Rajshahi ( 23 Bde ) was sacked by Mitha  for cowardice and replaced by Lt Col Abdullah (7^th or 8^th PMA) .

25 Punjab placed under 34 Bde. 32 Punjab already under 34 Bde. 12 Punjab also part of 34 Bde.

4 FF was in 205 Brigade (Col Abbasi -5^th OTS- good offr) – 8 Baluch also part of 205 Bde.

57 Bde went to 9 Div Kushtia in April 1971.

1^ST WEEK OF april 1971 16 Div haq went to Ishurdi by C 130 .

No transport .

There was no transport so I  got hold of a civilian Bus which I  mysel drove . Diesel was arranged from an abandoned fuel train on the station.

Drove to Nator palace of Hindu Raja.Raja had migrated to India long ago and palace held by govt.

No fighting in Rajshahi division except Pabna where some people of 25 Punjab. Santahar many Biharis but not more than 400 were killed.

Bogra no fighting.North west Bengal.

We discovered that whole  trains were taken to India including DC of Rajshahi by force . He came back after one month and stayed as DC Rajshahi.

Patrolling done but area peaceful.

Eastern comd revealed in end August  1971 indian attack plan revealed by eastern comd. The plan was exactly the one executed by Indians with same force ratios.

In June General Hameed came to 16 Div HQ and Maj Gen Nazar briefed him . Sir we have restored the authority of GOP in Rajshahi division but we cannot rule ? What is the plan ? Hameed was absolutely blank and just said lets have tea break.

It is shocking that our GHQ planners took no action following discovery of this plan which as per force ratios clearly proved that Indians would overrun East Pakistan.

Eastern comd issued op instructions that defence will be fortress defence.

Pabna fortress , Natore Fortress  rajshahi Fortress, Hill Fortress, Dinajpur,Thakurgaon, Rangpur , Bogra stocked with ration and ammunition for at least six weeks.

Concept was that when war will start army will fight as fortresses because of Indian air superiority and fear of mukti bahini.This plan was made by Eastern Comd under lt gen Niazi.

In june 1971 33 Div was formed and I  came to hand them over all secret docs.Staff college instructors requested for briefing as my cousin Lieutenant Colonel Agha Manzur Rauf also a DS informed them.

I was shocked that there was great optimism which I would call misplaced optimism and  staff college instructors were CONVINCED  that if war starts Pakistan would win.

I  briefed  staff college instructors about operations—situation under control except that during night mukti bahini was active.

Indians did arty firing all along the border from april 1971. Indians had fixed timings so at that time people did not go out.fixed ration of five to six rounds.

Essence of my briefing was that during war Indian air will knock out dacca airfield on first day of the war  so day movement would not be possible due to Indian air and night movement would also be very difficult due to Mukti Bahini and the chances were that East Pakistan would be overrun.

Limpid mines magnetic soviet origin were used . no ship was sunk but delayed.

Mines planted by mukti bahini near cut tel lines.

Railways massively damaged.

September end posting order came – 6 engr bn part of 14 div going by ship from Khulna came with 27 baluch.

Flew to Karachi 7 oct 1971.

Reached Jhelum 15 oct 1971.

20 Oct 1971 took comd .

Unit reached Jhelum on 16 oct 1971.

200 soldiers deserted but we took no action as they were desperate due to prolonged stay in east Pakistan. Most returned to unit in 2 to 4 days .

Only action taken against those who overstayed for long duration one or two people.

25 oct 1971 sent to 8 div to lay minefield.

Also 7 engr (8 div) and 8 engr (6 armd div) also took part  in minefd laying.

21 nov minefield finished.

Went to chak jhumra22 nov .

Bridge trg  on bangle khudadad on small canal.

3^rd dec 1971 went to ballewala between arif wala and sahiwal.

Two bridges on eastern sadiqiya canal one at jalwala  (7 div)and one at gulab ali on hakra branch for first armd div.

Jalwala rafi alam suggested that area was boggy and armour would get stuck.

Shows mediocre level of professionalism in both 7 Div and 1^st Armd Div where except Shah Rafi Alam no one was pushed about the war and bridges and trafficability.

KM Arif (Col Staff 1 Armd Div) , S.R Kallue GSO 1 1^stArmd Div ) , EH Dar (Col staff 7 Div).

2 corps engr comd was saad tariq.

CONCLUSION

ARMY OP WAS NOT FEASIBLE  IN EAST PAKISTAN.

NO EFFORT WAS MADE TO ENGAGE SH MUJIB UR REHMAN.

NAVAL POWER DID NOT EXIST

AIR POWER DID NOT EXIST

USA A SUPER POWER WAS TRYING TO GET OUT OF VIETNAM.

YAHYA KHAN WAS KEPT IN PABBI REST HOUSE FOR FGCM.

ARMY ACTION DECISION IN 1971 WAS TAKEN IMPROMPTU.

ARMY WAS HOLDING MAXIMUM 10 PERCENT AREA.

DAYLIGHT MOVEMENT WAS NO PROBLEM AT ALL AND NO ONE EVER ATTACKED ARMY.

ARMY LEADERSHIP SIMPLY FAILED TO CLEARLY ASSESS THE SITUATION.

The greatest failure was at strategic level where Pakistan Army had no plan to save East Pakistan as I harshly discovered when I was posted to Pakistan Armys Military Operations Directorate in 1973 as GSO -1 Plans.

The galaxy of inflated and overrated strategic failures in this exercise include Sahibzada Yaqub Ali Khan  Gul Hassan and Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan.